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INTRODUCTION
A corporate criminal is no scapegoat, assures the Department of Jus-tice ("DOJ"), because it is always a priority to target all culpable
individuals at a company. DOJ policy emphasizes that "[o]nly rarely
should provable individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if it
relates to high-level corporate officers," even if the company settles its
case with prosecutors.' After all, under the respondeat superior standard
that applies in federal criminal cases, a corporation can be prosecuted if
and only if an employee committed a crime.2 As the Supreme Court has
put it, "[T]he only way in which a corporation can act is through the in-
dividuals who act on its behalf."' Yet, as is increasingly the subject of
high-profile criticism, more often than not, when the largest corporations
are prosecuted federally, individuals are not charged.4 In this Article, I
develop data describing these individual prosecutions-which tend to
result in light sentences when convictions are obtained.' These data il-
lustrate the special challenges of bringing corporate prosecutions, and
they suggest why, in contrast to what prominent critics have argued,
bringing more individual cases is no adequate substitute for prosecuting
companies. I conclude by proposing how corporate prosecutions could
be brought to enhance individual criminal accountability.
The corporation appears to be a kind of a scapegoat: perhaps not en-
tirely blameless, as in the traditional concept, but literally impossible to
actually jail-yet capable of receiving the brunt of blame and punish-
ment, while the individual culprits go free.6 Data presented in this Arti-
1 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorneys' Manual § 9-28.200 (2008) [hereinafter U.S. Attor-
neys' Manual], available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf,
archived at http://penna.cc/6QFL-6Z76.
2 Id.; see N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-95
(1909) (approving corporate criminal liability under a respondeat superior standard).
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943).
4 See, e.g., infra notes 7, 9.
5 Preliminary data on this subject are described briefly in a recent book, Brandon L. Gar-
rett, Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations 83 (2014) [hereinafter
Garrett, Too Big to Jail] (describing how of 255 deferred and non-prosecution agreements
entered by federal prosecutors between 2001 and 2012, approximately one-third of the
agreements were accompanied by individual prosecutions). These data presented here are
updated but also far more fine grained, examining separate questions concerning how many
charges resulted in acquittals, dismissals, and trials, and what types of sentences were grant-
ed upon conviction.
A "scapegoat" can be defined as "one that bears the blame for others," and in particular a
non-person incapable of moral blame, as in "a goat upon whose head are symbolically
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cle suggest that the problem of individual and corporate prosecution re-
quires far more careful consideration. In about two-thirds of deferred
and non-prosecution agreements ("DPAs" and "NPAs") with companies,
no individual officers or employees were prosecuted for related crimes.
Many were quite high-profile prosecutions; well over half were public
corporations, and many were Fortune 500 and Global 500 companies.
The companies are required to admit their crimes and accept responsibil-
ity for them, and yet the individual culprits faced no criminal conse-
quences.
The problem becomes far more complex, however, when one asks
what occurs when individual officers and employees are charged. In this
Article, I study the outcomes in those cases in some detail. Prosecutors
typically obtained light sentences and experienced quite high numbers of
outright losses in the form of acquittals and dismissals. As will be de-
scribed in Part I, from 2001 to 2014, prosecutors entered 306 deferred
and non-prosecution agreements with companies.9 Among those, 34%,
or 104 companies, had officers or employees prosecuted, with 414 total
individuals prosecuted.o Most prosecuted individuals were not high-up
officers of the companies, but rather middle managers of one kind or an-
other. Of the individuals prosecuted in these cases, thirteen were presi-
dents, twenty-six were CEOs, twenty-eight were CFOs, and fifty-nine
were vice-presidents." What happened in these cases? Of the 414 indi-
viduals, 266, or 65%, pleaded guilty.12 And forty-two were convicted at
a trial, an elevated trial rate of 10%.13 How were convicts sentenced for
these corporate crimes? The average sentence, including those who re-
ceived probation but no jail time, was eighteen months. As I will de-
placed the sins of the people after which he is sent into the wilderness in the biblical cere-
mony for Yom Kippur." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1108 (11th ed. 2003).
Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 83 (noting that individuals were prosecuted ac-
companying 89 of 255 agreements).
8 Id. at 62 (noting that thirty-one percent of corporations were either a Fortune or Global
500 firm the year they settled their prosecutions).
9I have maintained for some time the most complete data available on such federal de-
ferred and non-prosecution agreements with corporations. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon
Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, U. Va. Sch. L.,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution-agreements/home.suphp, archived at
htt://perma.cc/SNK7-MZHT (last updated July 31, 2015).
See infra Section I.A.
" See infra Section I.A.
12 See infra Section L.A.
13 See infra Section I.A.
2015] 1791
1792 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 101:1789
scribe, that is somewhat lower than average sentences for many of the
relevant federal crimes. The average sentence among those who did re-
ceive jail time was higher-forty months. 14 But it was only 42% or 128
of the 308 individuals convicted (266 who pleaded guilty and 42 who
were convicted at trial) who received any jail time.'s This is a low im-
prisonment rate.16 To be sure, many convicts paid large fines. Of the in-
dividuals prosecuted, 144 individuals were fined, with an average fine of
$382,000.'1
Of still greater concern was the large number of prosecution losses:
15% of the cases were unsuccessful, which, as I will develop in Part I, is
far higher than what is typical in federal white-collar prosecutions.18 Fif-
ty-two individuals had charges dismissed pretrial. Eleven were acquitted
at trial." Still other cases were not ultimately successful; nine had con-
victions reversed on appeal. 20 In addition, forty individuals were charged
but have not been convicted, either because the cases are still pending,
or individuals are fugitives or have not been successfully extradited.2 '
"There is no such thing as too big to jail," Attorney General Eric
Holder announced in a stern video message in May 2014, underscoring
that no financial institution "should be considered immune from prose-
cution." 22 Yet it is increasingly common to hear complaints, including
from prominent politicians, judges, journalists, and academic commenta-
tors, that the government "has prosecuted only a handful of individuals
in the Wall Street meltdown of 2008."23 Presidential candidate Hillary
Clinton has said, "Even though some institutions have paid fines and
even admitted guilt, too often it seems like the people responsible get off
14 See infra Section I.A.
15 See infra Section I.A.
'
6 For detailed comparisons with U.S. Sentencing Commission data, see infra Subsection
I.A.1.c.
17 See infra Subsection I.A.1.c.
1 See infra Subsection I.A.1.c.
19 See infra Subsection I.A.I.c.
20 See infra Subsection I.A.I.c.
21 See infra Subsection I.A.1.c.22 Jonathan Weil, There Is Still Such a Thing as 'Too Big to Jail,' BloombergView (May
6, 2014, 4:03 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-06/there-is-still-such-
a-thing-as-too-big-to-jail.
23 Alicia Mundy, U.S. Effort to Remove Drug CEO Jolts Firms, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 2011,
at Al; see also Henry N. Pontell et al., Too Big to Fail, Too Powerful to Jail? On the Ab-
sence of Criminal Prosecutions After the 2008 Financial Meltdown, 61 Crime L. & Soc.
Change 1, 10-12 (2013) (discussing reasons why the federal government has failed to make
significant prosecutions in response to the global meltdown of 2008).
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with limited consequences (or none at all)."24 The concerns have also
been raised in areas of federal criminal practice unrelated to banks or to
the causes of the financial crisis. For example, then-Senator Arlen Spec-
ter asked in 2010 hearings why no employees of Siemens were prose-
cuted for foreign bribery violations after the company paid record fines
to settle a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") prosecution. Senator
Spector asked, "[W]ho's going to jail?"25 (Subsequently eight employees
were indicted, but none have to date been extradited to the United
States.) 26 In environmental prosecutions, critics have also asked why ex-
ecutives have not been targeted following deadly spills, mine explo-
sions, and other disasters.2 7
Federal Judge Jed Rakoff has offered a prominent critique of this
problem, arguing that prosecutors are too quick to settle corporate cases
on lenient terms after hasty investigations; he concludes that prosecuting
individuals would be more effective than "imposing internal compliance
measures that are often little more than window-dressing."28 Professor
Dan Richman has added that "simplistic clamoring for more heads" will
not address an underlying need for "more systemic regulatory re-
forms."29 Still others have long argued that corporate criminal liability
24 Lisa Lerer, Hillary Clinton to Propose Increasing Capital Gains Taxes, Associated Press (July
20, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3d72340b0baa4370alad974f001b47e2/clinton-
prop ose-increasing-capital-gains-taxes, archived at http://perma.cc/2H2D-KRWY.
Christopher M. Matthews, Senators Question FCPA Enforcement Policies in Hearing, Main
Just. (Nov. 30, 2010, 7:25 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/2010/11/30/
senators-question-fcpa-enforcement-policies-in-hearing, archived at http://perma.cc/ENK6-
WUVV.
26 Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Eight Former Senior Executives and Agents
of Siemens Charged in Alleged $100 Million Foreign Bribe Scheme (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/20 11/eight-former-senior-executives-and-
agents-of-siemens-charged-in-alleged-100-million-foreign-bribe-scheme, archived at http://
perma.cc/BZP8-EUJUT; Ashby Jones, Extradition Is Hurdle in FCPA Prosecutions, Wall St.
J. (Oct. 2, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0000872396390444004704578
028430536186670.
27 David M. Uhlman, For 29 Dead Miners, No Justice, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/opinion/for-29-dead-miners-no-justice.html (noting
that "[w]e should not underestimate, however, the difficulty of prosecuting high-ranking of-
ficials in large corporations").
28 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prose-
cuted?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 9 2014, at 8, available at http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions. For an article
discussing Judge Rakoff's criticisms and presenting data from my book, see Michael Roth-
feld, Firms Are Penalized, but Workers Aren't, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2014, at Cl.
29 Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 265, 280 (2014).
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standards should be altered, sharply limited, or even abolished as incon-
sistent with the purposes of criminal law.30 Whether the allure of indi-
vidual prosecutions substitutes for efforts to provide sound regulation of
corporations, much less prosecution of noncompliant corporations re-
mains an important subject.
The relative lack of individual prosecutions raises a puzzle: One
might expect it to be far easier for prosecutors to bring white-collar cas-
es when they benefit from the company's cooperation. Companies typi-
cally agree to fully cooperate with investigations that may continue long
after the firm settles its case. Companies conduct detailed internal inves-
tigations, turn over documents, records, and emails, and they agree to
produce employees for interviews." DOJ officials began to respond to
critics with remarks in 2014 that highlighted the importance of "true"
corporate cooperation that provides "evidence against" the "culpable in-
dividuals."3 2 In September 2015, the DOJ released a new memorandum,
amending its guidelines to reflect a focus on individual accountability
for corporate crimes, stating, among other changes, that no longer will
corporations receive any credit for cooperation without providing all rel-
evant facts regarding individual misconduct.3 3 The DOJ also acknowl-
edged "many substantial challenges unique to pursuing individuals for
corporate misdeeds."34 Despite the remarkable access prosecutors can
obtain from companies, prosecutors still often do not succeed in holding
individuals accountable. Moreover, there is a separate scapegoating con-
cern that, when employees or individuals are charged, they may be iden-
30 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corpora-
tions, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1359, 1359 (2009); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Stand-
ard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1098-99 (1991); V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 1477, 1478-79 (1996); Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a "Good
Faith" Affirmative Defense, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1537, 1537-38 (2007); James R. Cop-
land, Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research, Regulation by Prosecution: The Problems with
Treating Corporations as Criminals, Civ. Just. Rep., Dec. 2010, at 1, 1-2.
31 See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 917, 930-
31 (2008) (discussing Supreme Court doctrine on coerced statements).
32 Marshall L. Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Remarks at the Global Investigation Review Program (Sept. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-principal-deputy-assistant-attomey-general-
criminal-division-marshall--miller, archived at https://perma.cc/T7GA-VHLT?type=source.
33 Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
All U.S. Att'ys et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Yates Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
34 Id. at 2.
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tified based on the information the company offered to prosecutors. The
higher-ups, who may control negotiations with prosecutors, may them-
selves remain above the fray while lower-level employees are "thrown
under the bus."
After detailing these empirical findings, this Article turns in Part II to
explaining why it is that corporate prosecutions are not associated with
many successful individual prosecutions. Critics are right to suggest that
prosecuting individuals has been a priority for some corporate crimes
but not others-with, for example, antitrust being an exception. The
"corporate scapegoat" problem goes to the heart of a central rationale for
settling corporate prosecutions. However, there are other important ra-
tionales that I will detail in Part II of this Article. Although such cases
have largely escaped criticism, it may be just as problematic or more so
when only individuals are prosecuted and not the corporation. Justice is
not fully served by individual prosecutions if only the company can pay
adequate fines, restitution to victims, or change practices and policies to
prevent future crimes. In my view, justice is served by prosecuting cor-
porations.3 ' But neither individual nor corporate prosecutions are neces-
sarily a ready substitute for each other. While corporate cooperation can
help overcome practical obstacles, corporate complexity raises still oth-
ers, particularly regarding showing intent. Establishing culpability of in-
dividuals acting within complex organizations can be difficult. For strict
liability offenses, the conduct may be easy to prove, but less worthy of
prosecution due to low culpability. Prosecuting thousands of traffic tick-
ets may make little sense-particularly if the company can pay one mas-
sive ticket to cover the social cost. Or if the conduct was very serious
but committed by low-level employees, focusing on the corporation may
be the best way to address the problem. Regulatory crimes may be best
resolved by settling with the regulated entity. In such areas, treating the
corporation as the scapegoat makes eminent sense.
35 For a sampling of the literature, see, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Control-
ling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
687, 689-93 (1997) (arguing that corporate prosecutions effectively deter delinquency by
corporate agents); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81
Ind. L.J. 473, 477-78 (2006) (arguing that corporate prosecutions effectively alter group be-
havior to prevent wrongdoing among corporate agents); Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corpo-
rate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and Sanctions, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141,
1145 (1983) (arguing that deterrence is not the sole purpose of corporate criminal law). For
an overview, see Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 254-55 (proposing reforms to
"mak[e] corporate prosecutions more effective").
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In Part III, I will explore three types of reforms. First, I will examine
proposals to enact new substantive crimes to reach complex corporate
malfeasance or even financial negligence, which I view as ill advised.
Instead, I will propose a series of legislative changes that may do far
more good. Statutes of limitations could be extended for categories of
complex corporate cases. The Speedy Trial Act could be revised to per-
mit deferred prosecutions for corporations only if the firm cooperates to
identify culpable individuals.36 Sentencing statutes and guidelines could
be revised to similarly tighten requirements for corporate cooperation.
Second, I will explore changes to.DOJ policy and practice. In some are-
as, prosecutors may have rested secure having obtained a corporate set-
tlement with eye-catching fines. Using corporate prosecutions to charge
individuals-securing "more heads"-would require stricter policies and
added resources for investigations and enforcement. A third approach,
emerging in a few recent cases, uses corporate settlements to change the
incentives for employees and officers at the firm, using what I have
termed "structural reforms" to prevent future criminality.
Despite DOJ policy that "only rarely" should "culpable individuals"
not be prosecuted, far too many corporate cases lack individual prosecu-
tions.3 9 The uneven results in individual prosecutions that are brought
illustrate why the pattern persists. However, I will conclude in this Arti-
cle that, contrary to what some critics have argued, corporate prosecu-
tions need not come at the cost of individual accountability-corporate
prosecutions can and should be used to enhance individual accountabil-
ity and deter corporate crime.
I. INDIVIDUAL PROSECUTIONS AND CORPORATE CRIMES
The relationship between individual criminals and corporations may
be compatible, entirely opposing, or still more complex. White-collar
criminals typically work for larger companies, and they may be taking
advantage of their employer and acting solely in their own interest, act-
ing in their employer's interest, or acting both to advance themselves
and the larger corporate enterprise. For that reason, depending on the
case, the focus of prosecutors may be squarely placed upon the culpable
36 Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (2012).
37 Richman, supra note 29, at 280.
38 See infra Section II.F.
3 9 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 1.
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individuals, but it may also be placed on the corporation itself. Take as
an example the prominent deferred prosecution agreement entered in
2014 with Toyota, resulting in a $1.2 billion settlement and detailed ad-
missions concerning misleading consumers regarding safety issues.40
The safety violations at Toyota, concerning floor mats that could entrap
passengers as well as "sticky" accelerator pedals, had resulted in deaths
and endangered millions of drivers. 41 Because corporate policies and
compliance were implicated, prosecutors understandably focused on en-
forcement at the corporate level.
At the time the case was settled, the Attorney General pronounced,
"Rather than promptly disclosing and correcting safety issues about
which they were aware, Toyota made misleading public statements to
consumers and gave inaccurate facts to Members of Congress." 2 How-
ever, individuals clearly had (by definition) been involved in the under-
lying conduct and in making the lengthy series of false statements that
the prosecutors described in some detail when the case was settled. Per-
haps they did not personally profit from the crimes, but individuals may
have received promotions, bonuses, or other rewards for engaging in the
conduct.
Yet at the press conference announcing the deferred prosecution
agreement, despite language in the agreement requiring Toyota to coop-
erate in any investigations of individual employees, the U.S. attorney
stated that no individual prosecutions were anticipated.4 3 U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara said, "I'm not fore-
closing anything necessarily," but also that "we believe this to be a final
resolution of the case, of course pending successful completion of the
probationary period of three years."" He added,
As you might imagine, when you have a company with individuals
who are responsible for unlawful conduct in other jurisdictions, there
are problems of evidence and problems of proof. It happens to be the
40 Toyota Gets Prosecution Deferred, No Corporate Crime Plea, No Individuals Charged,
Corp. Crime Rep., Mar. 24, 2014, at 5 [hereinafter Toyota Gets Prosecution Deferred].
41 Id. at 7.
42 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Announces Criminal Charge
Against Toyota Motor Corporation and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $1.2 Billion
Financial Penalty (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
announces-criminal-charge-against-toyota-motor-corporation-and-deferred, archived at
httos://perma.cc/S9KR-B9NX?type=source.
Toyota Gets Prosecution Deferred, supra note 40, at 5.
4 Id.
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case that the rules of evidence sometimes do not allow you to use cer-
tain kinds of evidence and certain documents against certain individu-
als, although they might be admissible against the company itself.
Although there is an admission that there were individuals who en-
gaged in conduct which provides for a basis to bring a case against the
company, they are not charged there.45
What did U.S. Attorney Bharara mean? There could be jurisdictional
impracticalities involved in obtaining access to documents and emails in
another country. Extraditing individuals might be a challenge. But then
again, Toyota had promised its cooperation, and documents the compa-
ny itself provided could be used against employees. The statement of
facts described conduct by U.S. employees of Toyota.46 The evidence
problem U.S. Attorney Bharara referred to was that certain documents
could be admissible as against Toyota as party admissions, but if they
were not admissible as business records, they might then not be admissi-
ble against individual employees. 47 Was it really so difficult to show,
however, aside from the company's bare admission, who did what to
bring about these serious violations? How was it that the company ad-
mitted to conduct by individuals, but they were "not charged there"? 48
Those comments do not clear up the puzzle, which only deepens when
one looks at a common pattern extending across cases.
A. Data on Corporate and Individual Prosecutions
A study examining whether individuals are prosecuted when corpora-
tions are prosecuted requires, as a starting place, information about when
corporations are prosecuted and how often that occurs. Unfortunately,
there had not been good federal data on corporate prosecutions, in part
because the practice of corporate prosecutions radically shifted over the
past decade. In the 1990s, corporations were typically convicted if pros-
ecuted, and as a result, ideally at least, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
would collect data on how many were prosecuted and how they were
sentenced. I say "ideally," because researchers in the late 1990s found
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Fed. R. Evid. 803(2)(d) (recognizing hearsay exception for party-opponent's statement);
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (recognizing hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted ac-
tivity of a business).
48 Toyota Gets Prosecution Deferred, supra note 40, at 5.
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the Commission's data quite incomplete and lacking.4 9 That problem
grew worse over the past decade, however, since far more of the truly
important corporate prosecutions now do not result in a conviction, but
rather in alternatives to a conviction called deferred prosecution agree-
ments (in which a case is initially filed but stayed on a judge's docket
pending compliance with its terms), and non-prosecution agreements (in
which no criminal case is filed in court).
In 1999, under then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, the DOJ
issued its first memo providing guidelines for corporate prosecutions.so
The deferred prosecution approach was more firmly set out in 2003 in a
set of revised DOJ guidelines. These DOJ principles for the prosecution
of organizations, contained in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual used by fed-
eral prosecutors, were popularly called the "Thompson Memo" after
Larry Thompson, the Deputy Attorney General who revised them."
While the DOJ has revised the guidelines several more times, they main-
tain the same basic flexible approach, encouraging consideration of a set
of factors when deciding whether to pursue an indictment or conviction
of a corporation, or alternatively a deferred or non-prosecution agree-
ment.52
No data were kept on these organizational deferred or non-
prosecution agreements, despite their growing prominence. The U.S.
Sentencing Commission tracks data on cases in which a defendant or-
ganization is sentenced based on reporting from the federal district
courts, but non-prosecution deals involve no formal sentence or judg-
49 Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark A Cohen, Evaluating Trends in Corporate
Sentencing: How Reliable Are the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Data?, 13 Fed. Sent'g
Rep. 108, 109-10 (2000); Cindy R. Alexander, Jennifer Arlen & Mark A. Cohen, Regulating
Corporate Criminal Sanctions: Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of Public Firms, 42
J.L. & Econ. 393, 416, 419-20 (1999); see also Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Director,
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to the Honorable William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n 2 (June 22, 1988), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/topical-index-
publications/1 9891213_PublicAccessDocumentsData.pdf
50 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Compo-
nent Heads & U.S. Att'ys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999)
(on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
51 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 1, §§ 9-28.000-9-28.100, 9-28.300.
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ment." A deferred prosecution is filed with the court and remains on the
judge's docket until the term is completed and the case is dismissed. A
non-prosecution is never filed with a judge at all; such an agreement
states that prosecutors will not file if the corporation complies. As I have
described elsewhere, these deferred and non-prosecution agreements
with companies increasingly include many of the most important prose-
cutions, such as those of public corporations.5 4
As a result of my interest in obtaining information about these agree-
ments, for some time I have maintained with the University of Virginia
Law Library the most complete data available on such federal deferred
and non-prosecution agreements with corporations." My earlier work,
including a recent book, has described the characteristics of these
agreements in some detail. In Too Big to Jail, I described how among
the 255 deferred and non-prosecution agreements from 2001 to 2012,
only eighty-nine had individual officers or employees prosecuted.56
Among those eighty-nine deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements in which individuals were prosecuted, 385 people were
prosecuted, including ten presidents, twenty CEOs, and twenty-seven
CFOs.5 I also found that among the thirty-one publicly listed firms con-
victed between 2001 and 2012 that had individuals prosecuted, one
chairman, one president, four CEOs, and one CFO were prosecuted.
However, in that prior work, I did not explore more deeply the char-
acteristics of those cases, the results as they proceeded towards resolu-
tion, or how many resulted in a criminal judgment, or, if so, what types
of sentences were imposed. In this project, I not only update the earlier
dataset to include more recent corporate prosecutions, but also I track in
detail the path that each of those individual prosecutions of employees
and officers followed. What I found provides more cause for concern re-
garding the question of whether sufficient individual criminal accounta-
bility accompanies corporate criminal accountability.
53 See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2013 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics
tbls.51-54 (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
sourcebooks/2013/sourcebook-2013.
54 Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at ch. 3.
5s Garret & Ashley, supra note 9.
56 Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 82-83.
17 Id. at 107.
58 Id.
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1. Study Findings
The DOJ guidelines on corporate prosecutions have for some time
emphasized that "[b]ecause a corporation can act only through individu-
als, imposition of individual criminal liability may provide the strongest
deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing. Only rarely should prov-
able individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if it relates to
high-level corporate officers . . . ."59 Thus, the guidelines suggest that
culpable individuals might not be prosecuted if they are merely low-
level employees. The guidelines then add: "[P]rosecutors should not lim-
it their focus solely to individuals or the corporation, but should consider
both as potential targets."6 0 That language also indicates how the stand-
ard for corporate criminal liability used in federal courts is strict. As the
DOJ guidelines note, "Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a cor-
poration may be held criminally liable for the illegal acts of its directors,
officers, employees, and agents." 61 However, the DOJ guidelines also
highlight how it may be inadvisable to hold a corporation accountable
for the actions of isolated individuals; since corporate persons are more
complex, the guidelines set out factors to be considered, including "the
adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corpora-
tion's malfeasance." 62 Based on those guidelines, one might expect to
see many cases in which solely individuals are prosecuted, if they large-
ly acted on their own and for their own benefit, but one would not ex-
pect to see large numbers of cases in which the corporation was prose-
cuted, but not the culpable individuals.
In 2015, the DOJ issued a new memorandum, to be reflected in a re-
vision of the DOJ's organizational prosecution guidelines, clarifying that
to receive "any cooperation credit" a corporation must provide "all rele-
vant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct."6 3
Further, civil and criminal investigations "will focus on individuals from
the inception of the investigation." 64 Absent "extraordinary circumstanc-
5 See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 1.60 Id.
61 Id. (emphasis omitted). For a description of the origins of that respondeat superior
standard, see Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at ch. 2; see also Kathleen F. Brickey,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 Wash. U. L.Q.
393 (1982); Shaun P. Martin, Intracorporate Conspiracies, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 399, 406-07
(1998).
62 U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 1, § 9-28.300.
63 Yates Memo, supra note 33, at 2.
6 See id.
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es" or approved policy (such as the Antitrust Division's leniency poli-
cy), no culpable individuals will receive a "release" from liability when
the company settles its case.6 ' Furthermore, the new memo highlighted
the need to adopt a "clear plan" to pursue individual matters, with for-
mal declinations when individuals are not pursued.66 What impact these
new additions to the federal organizational prosecution guidelines will
have on future cases is difficult to predict. However, the problem that
this new guidance was designed to address becomes quite apparent when
one looks at the charging patterns accompanying corporate settlements.
From 2001 to 2014, federal prosecutors entered into 306 deferred and
non-prosecution agreements with companies. 67 Among those 306 com-
panies, only 104 companies have so far had individuals charged. 68 Ac-
companying those 104 corporate cases, there were 414 individuals pros-
ecuted. 69 These data reflect all individual cases that could be located.
There is no official listing of such cases, and corporate prosecution
agreements typically do not speak to whether any individuals have been
or will be charged, although accompanying press releases may do so.
Nor are the individual and corporate cases typically linked with shared
docket entries by the federal courts. These cases were located through
several types of searches: searches of DOJ press releases and news ac-
counts, and then searches through federal dockets for any cases reflect-
ing individual employees or officers named as possible subjects of fed-
eral criminal charges. These data, as a result, are likely not complete,
particularly for corporate cases settled in recent years in which investi-
gations may be pending. However, the fairly high-profile nature of these
deferred and non-prosecution agreements, many involving public corpo-
rations, means individual cases are far more likely to be reported in the
media.
Of those individuals charged, most were not higher-up officers of the
companies, but rather middle managers of one kind or another and also
some quite low-level individuals. Of the individuals charged in these
cases, thirteen were presidents, twenty-six were CEOs, twenty-eight
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See Garrett & Ashley, supra note 9.
68 See id.
69 See id.
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were CFOs, and fifty-nine were vice presidents.70 Of the CEOs prose-
cuted, perhaps the best known was Bernard Ebbers, convicted at trial for
securities fraud at MCI (Worldcom) and sentenced to twenty-five years
in prison.7 1 Six of the CEOs had trials, twelve pleaded guilty, but three
had charges dismissed or were acquitted. Three others have cases still
pending, and one foreign CEO remains at large as a fugitive.7 2
In the cohort of recent corporate prosecutions, still more individual
prosecutions may be yet to come, since white-collar investigations can
take some time to pursue. Comparatively more of the recent prosecu-
tions have not yet been resolved, as one would expect. For example, ten
former employees of CH2M Hill Hanford Group Inc. were indicted in
2013; none of those cases have yet resulted in a judgment. Quite a few
cases described further below involve foreign employees of foreign
companies who are fugitives or those who have not been extradited suc-
cessfully. Investigations may be ongoing in some of the most recent cas-
es, while in other prominent recent cases prosecutors have already pub-
licly indicated, such as at press conferences (as in the Toyota case
discussed), that no employee prosecutions are anticipated following the
settlement by the corporation.
The table below illustrates these data as a time trend from 2001 to
2014. What one sees is that there is not any sharp trend towards prose-
cuting more individuals in cases resulting in deferred prosecution
agreements. The trend is fairly flat, and the share of agreements accom-
panied by individual prosecutions remains fairly constant over the years.
The drop-off in 2013 and 2014 may not persist as those cases may be
70 See id. CEOs or former CEOs were charged at Alpha Natural Resources, Inc.; American
Italian Pasta Co.; ArthroCare Corp.; Aurora Foods; BDO USA LLP; BizJet International
Sales and Support, Inc.; Collins & Aikman Corp.; Computer Associates; Endocare; Fried-
man's Inc.; General Reinsurance Corp.; Halliburton Co.; HealthSouth Corp.; Intelligent De-
cisions, Inc.; InterMune; Louis Berger Group; MCI (WorldCom); McSha Properties; MRA
Holdings LLC; Orthoscript, Inc.; Spectranetics Corp.; Symbol Technologies; Unico, Inc.;
and Wellcare Health Plans, Inc. Id.
71 Carrie Johnson, Ebbers Gets 25-Year Sentence for Role in WoldCom Fraud, Wash.
Post, July 14, 2005, at Al.
72 Jonathan Dienst, Fugitive Long Island CEO Accused of $200 Million Fraud Wants
Apology, NBC N.Y. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nbenewyork.com/news/local/Tomo-
Razmilovic-Fugitive-Millionaire-Sweden-CEO-Symbol-Technologies-Long-Island-
23292133 1.html.
73 Annette Cary, CH2M Hill Managers Indicted for Hanford Timecard Fraud, Tri-City
Herald (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2013/03/23/2325573/ch2m-hill-
managers-indicted-for.html.
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accompanied by additional prosecutions in the next few years; there can
be a time lag between the corporate settlement and charges in individual
cases. However, these data suggest that we are not likely to see any
sharp change in the trend, unless prosecutors change their priorities and
approaches towards these cases. Prosecutors may say that they now fo-
cus on holding individuals accountable, but more evidence will have to
support any claim that there is actually some new trend towards doing
so.
Table 1: DPA/NPAs Accompanied by Individual Prosecutions, 2001-2014
45 ,
-nAgreements
with
Individuals
-i
Sentenced to
30 Jailtime
25 %Agreements
with
20 Individuals
Prosecuted
15
10 - Total
DPA/NPAs
0
This more fine-grained project examines not just the incidence but al-
so the characteristics of each of these individual prosecutions in order to
track what happened in each charged individual's case. While the above
table displays one piece of the puzzle-how often companies that settle
their prosecutions without a conviction have employees prosecuted-it
does not tell us about what kinds of corporate cases are accompanied by
individual prosecutions, and it does not tell us about what types of out-
comes result in cases in which such individuals are charged.
40
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If the sentences for the individuals who were targeted were quite se-
vere, one might conclude that prosecutors were carefully picking the
most serious cases, perhaps explaining why others went unprosecuted. If
the sentences were not lengthy, one might conclude that prosecutors
were not selecting cases with sufficient care, the underlying crimes did
not call for lengthy sentences, or that prosecutors faced unanticipated
obstacles. If cases were dismissed or dropped post-indictment, then one
wonders how carefully prosecutors were pursuing some of these cases.
The sections that follow describe the paths taken by these individual
prosecutions in the wake of high-profile corporate prosecution settle-
ments.
a. Convictions and Settlements
Guilty pleas are the most common result in criminal cases generally.
It was not surprising that what I found when examining these individual
prosecutions was that of the 414 cases, most of those convicted had
pleaded guilty. Of the 414 individuals, 266 pleaded guilty and 42 were
convicted at a trial. That is, however, a somewhat high trial rate of just
more than 10% (42 of 414 cases). Compare that to the guilty plea rate in
federal prosecutions generally, which is now about 97%, and has re-
mained over 95% for several years now.74
One explanation for this modestly higher trial rate may be the particu-
lar business crimes that these individuals were charged with. Trial rates
for fraud, for example, are almost 7%, antitrust is 6%, and bribery is al-
most 8%.7 There were a handful of settlements that did not involve
convictions. Five individuals obtained deferred prosecution agreements,
much like the corporations that they worked for, permitting them to
avoid both an indictment and a conviction upon successful completion
of the agreement's term. The table below illustrates these data.
74 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 53, at fig.C, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/FigureC.pdf.
7s Id. at tbl. 11, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table l .pdf.
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Table 2: Dispositions in Individual Prosecutions Accompanying Organ-
izational DPA/NPAs, 2001-2014
Pleaded Guilty (266 cases)
a Trial Conviction (42)
Dismissals (52)
U Acquittals (11)
Appellate Reversals (9)
*DPA (5)
* Pending (38)
What of the individuals who were not convicted and also did not have
charges dismissed? Several have trials pending. Some remain fugitives
at large, and in some areas federal prosecutors have gone to extraordi-
nary lengths to try to locate and extradite foreign individuals in white-
collar cases. As one would expect, in FCPA cases, international price-
fixing cartel cases, international tax violation cases, and others, locating
foreign employees of foreign corporations is no easy task.76
For example, FCPA cases may involve foreign bribery and often in-
volve conduct by foreign citizen employees of foreign subsidiaries or
corporations. One individual, dubbed the "Pirate of Prague," who prose-
cutors had sought in the Omega Advisors case, received a ruling from
the British Privy Council that he would not be extradited from the Ba-
hamas to face charges in the United States, on the grounds that foreign
76 On those practical obstacles generally, see Alison E. Lardo, The 2003 Extradition Treaty
Between the United States and United Kingdom: Towards a Solution to Transnational White
Collar Crime Prosecution?, 20 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 867, 867-71 (2006); Thomas G. Snow,
The Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar Crime: International Challenges and the
Legal Tools Available to Address Them, 11 IWm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 209, 211-18, 235-43
(2002).
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bribery was not a crime in the Bahamas. 77 In another FCPA case involv-
ing Alcatel-Lucent, an individual is currently a fugitive." In the largest
FCPA case (involving a guilty plea, so not part of this dataset) involving
Siemens, a large group of eight executives has been indicted in the Unit-
ed States but have not been extradited in the years since.79 Similarly,
prosecutors have pursued a wave of actions against Swiss banks (and in-
creasingly other European banks) for promoting tax evasion. The former
head of private banking at Bank Frey & Co., AG, which itself shut down
rather than face prosecution, remains a fugitive, as was UBS banker Ra-
oul Weil, who was indicted in 2009, until his capture in Italy and extra-
dition in 2013 (he was then acquitted at trial)."
At the other end of the spectrum, in terms of numbers of employees
prosecuted, is the Pilgrim's Pride case, in which twenty-five employees
were prosecuted for immigration violations (still additional non-citizens
were convicted for misuse of a Social Security Account number and
hundreds of non-citizens were apprehended).81 Immigration sweeps,
however, are hardly anyone's idea of netting the big fish. In that case,
for example, only one supervisor, a human resources employee, was
prosecuted (and the charges were dismissed), while the twenty-three
others were employees prosecuted for using fraudulent documentation,
mostly receiving sentences of time served (ranging from about ten to
twenty months).82 In the IFCO Systems case, one of the more ambitious
77 David Glovin, Kozeny Won't Be Sent to U.S., U.K. Privy Council Rules, Bloomberg
Bus. (Mar. 28, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-
28/kozeny-won-t-be-extradited-to-u-s-u-k-privy-council-rules-1-.
78 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries Agree
to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27, 2010),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcatel-lucent-sa-and-three-subsidiaries-agree-pay-92-million-
resolve-foreign-corrupt.
7 Edward Wyatt, Former Siemens Executives Are Charged with Bribery, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 14, 2011, at B4; see Matthews, supra note 25.
so Jay R. Nanavati & Justin A. Thornton, DOJ and IRS Use "Carrot 'n Stick" to Enforce
Global Tax Laws, Crim. Just., Summer 2014, at 4, 7; Associated Press, Swiss Banker Raoul
Weil Acquitted in Tax Evasion Trial in Florida, The Guardian (Nov. 3, 2014, 5:46 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/nov/03/swiss-banker-acquitted-tax-evasion-trial-
raoul-weil-florida.
81 News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Justice Department and
ICE Reach $4.5 Million Agreement with Pilgrim's Pride (Dec. 30, 2009),
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0912/091230beaumont.htm.
United States. v. Villarreal, No. 5:08-CR-00001 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2008) (order grant-
ing dismissing indictment without prejudice); United States v. Totosaus-Rodriguez, No.
5:08-CR-00002 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008).
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corporate prosecutions involving immigration violations, sixteen man-
agers and other supervisors were convicted. However, most pleaded
guilty, paid fines, and served no jail time, and the government settled the
remaining cases on the eve of trial in 201 1.84
In a fraud case, twenty-three employees of the New York Racing As-
sociation were convicted, including its director and a vice president.85 A
series of seventeen employees at KPMG were prosecuted, although most
of those prosecutions were later dismissed.86 More higher-ups were
prosecuted in a case involving fraud at the Newsday Corporation, but all
nine individuals received probation and no jail time.
b. Prosecution Losses
These individual prosecutions accompanying corporate cases in-
volved high rates of outright prosecution losses in the form of dismissals
and acquittals. One reason why individual prosecutions may not be
brought is the difficulty in winning them; prosecutors would be right to
be hesitant to bring weak cases, even if the corporation has admitted that
crimes were committed. Fifty-two individuals had charges dismissed
pretrial. Eleven defendants were acquitted at trial. Thus, there were large
numbers of prosecution losses: 15% of the 414 cases resulted in outright
losses in the form of dismissals or acquittals. Still other cases were un-
successful. Nine more have so far had trial convictions reversed on ap-
peal. An additional group of thirty-eight cases remains in progress, ei-
ther with trial or sentencing proceedings still to come or because
defendants are fugitives or have not yet been extradited.
How do the acquittals and dismissals compare to dispositions in fed-
eral criminal cases more generally? The DOJ in its annual reports pro-
vides data, of a sort, on white-collar-related offenses and numbers of
convictions, acquittals, and dismissals. In fiscal year 2013, for example,
the DOJ reported 7,758 total white-collar convictions, and of those only
83 United States v. Davidson, No. 4:10-cr-00201 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 1,2010).
84 Id.
8 David Grening, NYRA Fined $3M for Fraud, ESPN (Dec. 12, 2003),
ht://espn.go.com/horse/news/2003/1212/1684776.html.
See Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 112-14.
Associated Press, Newsday and Hoy Settle Circulation Case for $15 Million, N.Y. Times
(Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/business/media/19newsday.html.
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about 7% were either dismissals (521) or acquittals (59).88 The losses
were lower in areas of particular relevance to corporate prosecutions. In
securities fraud cases, there were 222 guilty verdicts, compared with on-
ly 4 acquittals and 7 dismissals. 89 In corporate fraud cases, there were 88
convictions, no acquittals, and 5 dismissals.90 One area with more dis-
missals was in the area of federal-program fraud, in which there were
139 dismissals compared with 882 convictions, but that is not a crime
that was the subject of corporate deferred and non-prosecution agree-
ments.91
In the group of individuals charged alongside corporate deferred and
non-prosecution agreements, an additional thirty-four individuals have
not yet been convicted, either because the cases have not yet been re-
solved, proceedings are pending, or the individuals are fugitives or have
not been extradited. These cases involve more trials than federal crimi-
nal cases on average, with forty-two trial convictions, but ten acquittals,
and fifty-two with all charges dismissed (I should also note that still ad-
ditional cases had some but not all of their charges dismissed).
The most high-profile loss was the acquittal of Richard Scrushy, for-
mer CEO of HealthSouth, of fraud. (He was later convicted of an unre-
lated bribery charge.)92 Sixteen others at or formerly at HealthSouth
were prosecuted, including CFOs and treasurers. All but two pleaded
guilty (one was convicted at trial, and one had charges dismissed).9 3
88 U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Annual Statistical Report 58 tbl.3 (2013)
[hereinafter 2013 Annual Statistical Report], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
reading-room/reports/asr20l3/13statrpt.pdf. In fiscal year 2012, the DOJ reported 8,029 to-
tal white-collar convictions, and of those only about 8% represented outright losses: 609 re-
sulted in dismissals and 61 resulted in acquittals. U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attor-
neys' Annual Statistical Report 37 tbl.3 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 Annual Statistical Report],
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading-room/reports/asr20l2/12statrpt.pdf.
89 In securities fraud cases in fiscal year 2012, there were 231 guilty verdicts, compared
with only 1 acquittal and 13 dismissals. 2012 Annual Statistical Report, supra note 88, at
tbl.3.
90 2013 Annual Statistical Report, supra note 88.
91 Id.
92 Walter Pavlo, Former HealthSouth CEO, Richard Scrushy, Gets Prison Sentenced Re-
duced, Forbes (Jan. 26, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/
2012/01/26/former-healthsouth-ceo-richard-scrushy-gets-prison-sentenced-reduced/.
9 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Sarbanes-Oxley's Lost Promise: Why CEOs Haven't Been
Prosecuted, Reuters (July 27, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2012/07/27/sarbanes-oxleys-lost-promise-why-ceos-havent-been-prosecuted; Kyle
Whitmire, Ex-HealthSouth Executive Convicted at Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2005, at C2,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/19/business/exhealthsouth-executive-
convicted-at-trial.html; Associated Press, Prosecutors Drop Charges Against Bennett in
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The dismissed charges were sometimes dismissed at the request of
prosecutors, however, and it is not always easy to tell whether the rea-
sons had to do with the merits of the case or other considerations not ap-
parent from the public record. In the Reliant Energy case, brought re-
garding the company's role in fraud that created an artificial energy
crisis in California in 2000-2001, with a dramatic rise in energy prices
for consumers and a series of blackouts, prosecutors dismissed charges
against the four energy traders at the center of the scheme, ostensibly to
reward them for their cooperation, while providing the company with a
deferred prosecution agreement in which it paid a twenty-two million
dollar fine (rewarding the company for its cooperation as well?).94 The
case is an example in which leniency was provided both to the company
and to individuals. In the Collins & Aikman case, charges were dis-
missed on the eve of trial in 2007.95
c. Jail Time
When individual officers and employees were successfully prosecuted
and convicted, the resulting sentences tended to be lower than average,
even given the rough available comparisons with Sentencing Commis-
sion data concerning similar crime categories. The average sentence
among these individuals studied, including those who received probation
but no jail time, was eighteen months, which is somewhat lower than the
averages for many of the relevant federal crimes. For all federal fraud
sentences, and those include small-fry welfare cheats as well as the most
sophisticated financial frauds (almost 8,000 fraud convicts in fiscal year
2013), the mean sentence was twenty-six months; for antitrust it was ten
months; for bribery it was twenty-two months; and for environmental
offenses it was just four months.96 I also note, however, that the average
HealthSouth Case, Fla. Times-Union (July 19, 2005, 5:30 PM), http://jacksonville.com/tu-
online/apnews/stories/071905/D8BENI880.shtml; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five
Defendants Sentenced in HealthSouth Fraud Case (Dec. 10, 2003), http://www.justice.gov/
archive/opa/pr/2003/December/03 crm_678.htm.
94 Karen Gullo, Reliant to Pay $22 Million to Resolve Federal Charges, Bloomberg (Mar. 6,
2007, 11:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid-ax2RLRaf.iHk.
95 J. Robert Brown, The Stockman Dismissal: What Really Happened?, TheRacetotheBot-
tom.org (Jan. 12, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.com/stockman/the-
stockman-dismissal-what-really-happened.html.
96 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 53, at tbl.13, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013ffablel3.pdf. Those Sentenc-
ing Commission statistics treat probation-only sentences as sentences of zero months. Id.
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sentence among those who did receive jail time was forty months, which
is somewhat high for the types of crimes involved.
Below is a scatterplot image of the variation in sentences. The highest
sentences were former CEO Bernard Ebbers's twenty-five-year sentence
in the Worldcom case (in 2005), three twenty-year sentences for fraud
charges in the Scientific Applications International Corp. case (all in
2014), a twenty-year sentence in the ArthroCare Corp. case (2014), and
a seventeen-year sentence for Timothy Rigas in the Adelphia Communi-
cations case (2004). Each stands out at the upper end of the spectrum in
the below scatterplot table.
Table 3: Scatterplot, Individual Jail Time in Months, 2001-2014
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At the other end of the spectrum, most of the marks on this scatterplot
lie at a baseline of no jail time at all. Twenty-seven of the individuals
prosecuted in cases accompanying corporate deferred or non-
prosecution agreements received time served. And it was only 42%, or
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128, of the 305 individuals convicted (263 who pleaded guilty and 42
convicted at trial) who received any jail time. (In several cases the plea
agreement was sealed, and no information about the sentence could be
obtained.) Should this be surprising?
One might expect that many, if not most, of these individuals did not
have any prior criminal record of any significance. Nevertheless, 42% is
a very low rate of imprisonment. For federal fraud prosecutions in gen-
eral, 78% receive imprisonment and 15% receive probation without con-
finement.97 A better comparison group, however, may be convicts with
very low guideline sentence ranges because of, for instance, limited
criminal records, since prison sentences may not even be required for
these individuals. Imprisonment rates for fraud convicts who are eligible
for non-prison sentences, for example, are slightly less than 50%.98
Thus, this degree of non-prison sentences may not be atypical for con-
victs without a prior criminal history.
Moreover, the guidelines related to economic losses or gains often
used to calculate fraud sentences have been the subject of both judicial
criticism for their potential unfairness and malleability as well as a de-
tailed proposal for revision from the American Bar Association.9 9 Per-
haps as a result, federal fraud sentences are particularly varied; while
sentences for fraud have increased as the U.S. Sentencing Commission
has adopted stricter sentences at the direction of Congress, federal judg-
es have increasingly exercised their discretion post-Booker v. United
97 Id. at tbl.12, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Tablel2.pdf. Similarly, for bribery prosecutions, 74% receive
imprisonment; for antitrust, 69% receive imprisonment; and for tax violators, 63% receive im-
prisonment. Id.
9 Id. at fig.F, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
re orts-and-sourcebooks/2013/FigureF.pdf.
Am. Bar Ass'n, A Report on Behalf of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice
Section Task Force on the Reform of Federal Sentencing for Economic Crimes (2014), availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaluncategorized/criminal-justice/economic
crimes.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4P8P-GGK9; see, e.g., United States v.
Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d
506, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Frank 0. Bowman III, Sentencing High-Loss Corpo-
rate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 167, 169 (2008) (explaining that judg-
es consider the sentences required by the guidelines for major fraud cases to be too high);
Alan Ellis, John R. Steer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, At a "Loss" for Justice: Federal Sentencing
for Economic Offenses, 25 Crim. Just. 34 (2011).
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States'00 to impose below-guidelines sentences in as many as half of all
fraud cases. 0'o
d. Probation
There was an average of thirty months of probation imposed in the
193 cases in which probation (or supervised release) was imposed.102 For
the others, either they received no probation or there was no information
on the docket concerning any probation. That average probation mirrors
the typical probation imposed on convicted companies and the average
two-year length of either corporate probation or deferred and non-
prosecution agreements with companies.10 3 A surprising number of these
individuals, however, received either no probation at all or short terms
of probation.
e. Fines
One would expect higher fines to be paid in white-collar cases involv-
ing financial crimes by professionals. Of the individuals prosecuted in
these cases, 138 individuals were fined, with an average fine of
$381,000. Among fraud convicts in federal court generally, 76% re-
ceived an order to pay a fine or restitution, with an average payment of
$1,743,742 and a median fine of $113,470.104 Among these individuals
prosecuted in cases in which there was a corporate deferred or non-
prosecution agreement, the fines varied widely. At one end of the spec-
100 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
101 Selected Sentencing, Guideline Application, and Demographic Information for §211.1 Of-
fenders, Symposium on Economic Crime, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/
sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/economic-crimes/
20130918-19-symposium/Selected _SentencingGuidelineApplication Demographic_1nfo.pdf.
102 In general, as noted, probation and prison/community split sentences are more common
the lower the guidelines range the convict was placed in. See U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, su-
pra note 53, at tbl.16, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Tablel6.pdf.
103 See Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 282; see also U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2010
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.53 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2010/Table53.pdf
(showing that 70.5% of organizations sentenced were placed on probation).
10 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 53, at tbl. 15, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Tablel5.pdf. For antitrust,
it was 88% that paid either a fine or restitution, with an average payment of $37,915, and for
bribery, it was 60% that paid either a fine or restitution, with an average payment of $375,520.
Id&
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trum was the $300 million forfeiture (along with one year of probation)
imposed on the founder and director of PartyGaming Plc, a judgment
which was paid.os A Jenkens & Gilchrist partner was ordered to pay
$371 million to the IRS and received a fifteen-year sentence, while an-
other was ordered to pay over $190 million in restitution.1 0 6 Best known
of all, former WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers, who received the long-
est prison sentence in the entire group, was fined $30 million and was
required to transfer all of his assets to the court.107 And a former
Deutsche Bank broker was ordered to pay $115,700,000 in restitution
and to forfeit $1 million in a case involving marketing and implementa-
tion of tax shelters.108
A handful of additional individuals paid over $1 million in fines. But,
just as with fraud convicts generally, where there are very high average
fines but quite a bit lower median fines, most of the others in this dataset
paid fines in the low thousands.
Remarkable payments can be recovered from major corporations, and
large restitution funds or forfeitures can be directed to victims of corpo-
rate crimes. 109 Compensating victims or obtaining fines, forfeiture, or
restitution through individual prosecutions, however, is a more equivo-
cal matter. The financial goals of white-collar prosecutions may be far
better achieved by also prosecuting the entity. I also found that the cor-
porate cases in which individuals were prosecuted had the same average
105 Docket at 1, 3, United States v. Dikshit, No. 1:08-cr-01265 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2008);
Spencer Ante, PartyGaming's Billionaire Founder Pleads Guilty and Forfeits $300 Million but
Web Site Continues, Bus. Wk. (Dec. 16, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/thethread/
techbeat/archives/2008/12/us-govemment_ b.html.
106 Patricia Hurtado, Ex-Jenkens & Gilchrist Lawyer Gets 8 Years in Tax Case, Bloomberg
Bus. (Mar. 2, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-01/ex-
lawyer-donna-guerin-gets-8-year-sentence-in-tax-shelter-case, archived at http://perma.cc/TE39-
N3Q2; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Former Jenkens & Gilchrist Attorney Sentenced to 15
Years in Prison for Orchestrating Multibillion Dollar Criminal Tax Fraud Scheme (June 25,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/former-jenkens-gilchrist-attomey-sentenced-15-years-pris
on-orchestrating-multibillion-dollar, archived at https://perma.cc/VDU4-TKCY?type=source.
107 Jennifer Bayot, Ebbers Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. Times
(July 13, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/business/13WIRE-EBBERS.html?page
wanted=print&_r-0.
10 Press Release, U.S. Atty's Office S. Dist. of N.Y., Former Deutsche Bank Broker Sentenced
in Manhattan Federal Court to 42 Months in Prison for Promoting Illegal Tax Shelters That Gen-
erated Billions of Dollars in Fraudulent Tax Losses (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nys/pressreleases/Marchl 3/ParseDavidSentencingPR.php, archived at https://perma.cc/YGH
9-7RHY?type=source.
109 Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 123-27 (describing the federal law and practice
of corporate criminal restitution and forfeitures).
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fines as those in which no employees were prosecuted. Individuals were
not prosecuted more often, then, in cases deserving particularly severe
financial penalties on the corporation.
2. Characteristics of the Corporate Prosecutions
Throughout, I have compared fines and jail sentences and other char-
acteristics of the individual prosecutions in my dataset to the Sentencing
Commission's data on fraud prosecutions in federal court generally. The
largest group of the individual prosecutions involved fraud, either secu-
rities fraud (18 cases) or some other type of fraud (42 cases). Over one-
third of the total deferred and non-prosecution agreements from 2001 to
2014 (109 of 306 cases) involved some type of fraud prosecution. Inter-
estingly, in 17 of 25 deferred and non-prosecution agreements involving
securities fraud, there were individual prosecutions. And while there
were few deferred prosecutions of companies in antitrust cases, individ-
uals were prosecuted in three of four antitrust cases. In contrast, only 13
of 75 FCPA cases were accompanied by individual prosecutions.
Table 4. DPA/NPA Crimes Accompanying Individual Prosecutions,
2001-2014
200
150
100
50
0.-E
No Fraud (41 Securities FCPA (13) Immigration False Pharma (7) Other (15)
Employees cases) Fraud (18) (4) statements (5)
Prosecuted
(203 cases)
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Cases involving financial institutions have been of special interest to
lawmakers, commentators, and the public more broadly. Among these
306 deferred and non-prosecution agreements, 66 cases involved finan-
cial institutions, defined quite broadly to include a range of types of
companies that focus on financial transactions, including commercial
banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and brokerages. This
group includes nine insurance companies, ranging from AIG to health
insurance companies like HealthSouth, and it includes not only major
Wall Street financial services firms and international banks like JPMor-
gan and HSBC, but also smaller banks like Union Bank of California
and United Bank for Africa and investment banks like Jefferies Group.
Among these sixty-six deferred and non-prosecution agreements with
financial institutions, 35%, or twenty-three cases, were accompanied by
individual prosecutions. "0 Four of the nine cases involving insurance
companies were accompanied by individual prosecutions."'
None of the nine cases involving violations of international sanctions
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA")
were accompanied by individual prosecutions. No individual officers or
employees were prosecuted in cases accompanying the fourteen deferred
and non-prosecution agreements involving banks violating the Bank Se-
crecy Act, a set of statutes related to prevention of money laundering.
(Four of those cases, like the HSBC case, involved both Bank Secrecy
Act and IEEPA charges.) No U.S. bank has been convicted of a crime of
money laundering, perhaps because such a conviction would require the
Comptroller of the Currency to initiate proceedings to terminate the
bank's license; instead, banks are prosecuted for violations of the Bank
Secrecy Act, which focuses on the lack of "internal controls" at the
110 Those cases involved deferred and non-prosecution agreements with Baystar Capital
Management LLC (fraud); ConvergEx Group, LLC (securities fraud); Deutsche Bank AG
(tax fraud); Diamondback Capital Management LLC (securities fraud); GE Funding Capital
Market Services, Inc. (FCPA); German Bank HVB (tax fraud); Jefferies Group LLC (fraud);
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (antitrust); Louis Berger Group (fraud); Mellon Bank, N.A. (theft);
Merrill Lynch (false statements); Mirant Energy Trading (false commodities reporting);
NETeller PLC (illegal gambling); Omega Advisors (FCPA); Prudential Equity Group (secu-
rities fraud); Rabobank (wire fraud); and UBS AG (three separate cases involving tax fraud,
antitrust, and wire fraud). Each of those agreements can be obtained at Garrett & Ashley,
supra note 9.
" Those cases involved deferred and non-prosecution agreements with AIG, General Re-
insurance Corp., HealthSouth Corp., and Wellcare Health Plans, Inc. Each of those agree-
ments can be obtained at Garrett & Ashley, supra note 9.
18 16 [Vol. 101:1789
Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat
bank. 112 Typically the banks receive deferred or non-prosecution agree-
ments for these internal controls violations, and the agreements may de-
scribe in some detail the failures to maintain effective anti-money-
laundering programs."'3 The question then arises why individuals are not
prosecuted for their failures to ensure that money laundering (or other
violations, such as violations of international sanctions) did not occur.
Federal District Judge Emmett G. Sullivan, when considering a de-
ferred prosecution agreement with Barclays Bank PLC concerning Bank
Secrecy Act violations, expressed outrage that no employees were being
charged: "No one goes to jail, no one is indicted, no individuals are
mentioned as far as I can determine . . . there's no personal responsibil-
ity."ll4 The prosecutor explained, "in this case, there ... was not some-
one who we could prove to a court beyond a reasonable doubt that
someone had committed an offense."
The judge responded, "There's no paper trail of $500 million being
funneled illegally to other countries? I mean, senior management . .. has
to know who's responsible for it. I mean, these weren't just computer
transfers. Someone had to mastermind this.""' The prosecutor respond-
ed, "We certainly looked," and added that Barclays "spent $250 million"
in internal investigations."16
The judge ultimately approved the agreement, but noted, "They spent
$250 million and couldn't find anyone responsible. That's just shocking,
you know. It is shocking, isn't it?""'
Similar concerns were raised in the high-profile HSBC prosecution, in
which the bank paid almost $2 billion to settle Bank Secrecy Act viola-
tions in the largest case of its kind to date." 8 A congressional investiga-
tion described not just a weak anti-money-laundering program at the
multinational bank, but also billions of dollars diverted to Mexican drug
112 12 U.S.C. § 93(d)(1) (2012); 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 563.177(c) (2012).
"3 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 12-cr-
00763 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013), 2013 WL 3306161.114 Transcript of Hearing on the Joint Motion for Approval of Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at 5-6, United States v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. CR 1:10-cr-00218 (D.D.C.
Auf. 17,2010).
1iId. at 8.
"
6 Id. at 8, 12.
"' Id. at 12.
11 Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Bank Said to Avoid Charges Over Laundering,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2012, at Al, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-
said-to-near-i -9-billion-settlement-over-money-laundering, archived at https://perma.cc/H7CE-
LVTS?type=source.
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cartels, groups linked to terrorism, and others, with a culture at the bank
that was pervasively polluted.1 19 The bank apparently kept staffing in its
compliance division low to reduce costs and fired a head of compliance
who complained about the lack of compliance resources.12 0 No HSBC
employees were prosecuted then or have been since. At the time, Sena-
tor Charles Grassley wrote a letter to the Attorney General complaining
about this issue:
The Department has not prosecuted a single employee of HSBC-
no executives, no directors, no AML compliance staff members, no
one. By allowing these individuals to walk away without any real pun-
ishment, the Department is declaring that crime actually does pay.
Functionally, HSBC has quite literally purchased a get-out-of-jail-free
card for its employees for the price of $1.92 billion dollars. 12 1
Others in Congress echoed that concern. Senator Jeff Merkley called it a
"'too big to jail' approach."l2 2 Senator Elizabeth Warren stated that, in
contrast to how federal prosecutors target individuals in cases not in-
volving major corporations or financial institutions, "evidently, if you
launder nearly a billion dollars for drug cartels and violate our interna-
tional sanctions, your company pays a fine and you go home and sleep
in your own bed at night."l 2 3
What explains the lack of prosecutions in these Bank Secrecy Act
cases? One possibility, discussed more in the next Part, is that prosecu-
tors view these cases as essentially about failures of compliance or regu-
latory violations best addressed at the corporate level. As I have de-
scribed elsewhere, these agreements have become increasingly detailed
119 Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations, Rep. on U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist
Financing: HSBC Case History 2-4 (2012).
120 Id. at 26-28.
121 Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley: Justice Department's Failure to Prose-
cute Criminal Behavior in HSBC Scandal Is Inexcusable (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.grassley.
senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-justice-departmentE2%80%99s-failure-prosecute-cri
minal-behavior-hsbc-scandal, archived at http://perma.cc/H2YP-XY2C.
122 Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley Blasts "Too Big to Jail" Policy for Law-
breaking Banks (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/merkley-
blasts-too-big-to-jail-policy-for-lawbreaking-banks, archived at http://perma.cc/FZS5-VQ93
[hereinafter Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley].
123 Chris Good, Elizabeth Warren Wants HSBC Bankers Jailed for Money Laundering,
ABC News (Mar. 7, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/03/elizabeth-warren-
wants-hsbc-bankers-jailed-for-money-laundering.
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and have required compliance provisions regulating employee behavior
at a level beyond what is typically found in most corporate prosecution
agreements. It is only formally true, however, that these are regulatory
violation cases. These cases are charged as Bank Secrecy Act cases
largely to protect the bank's charter from automatic revocation. The cas-
es may in fact involve quite serious money laundering of the precise
type that puts thousands of individuals in federal prison for extremely
long sentences (with mean federal sentences of thirty-five months in
2013).124 That the corporate form could turn a money-laundering scheme
on a grand scale into a regulatory violation for the company, and also for
the individuals involved, would be a quite troubling prospect-but the
question is whether prosecutors can show that employees intended to fa-
cilitate illegal money laundering;1 25 potential difficulties in showing in-
tent are discussed in the next Part.
Only thirteen of the seventy deferred and non-prosecution agreements
regarding FCPA violations included individual prosecutions. (Compare
the lack of FCPA prosecutions, for example, to the head FCPA prosecu-
tor's comment in 2008 that "[i]t is our view that to have a credible deter-
rent effect, people have to go to jail."l26 ) None of the banking or curren-
cy-reporting violations resulted in individual prosecutions, nor did
export violations, such as the nine deferred and non-prosecution agree-
ments regarding violations of the IEEPA.
What was also surprising, perhaps, was that slightly fewer (25%, or
31 of 125) convicted public companies or their subsidiaries had officers
or employees prosecuted.1 27 One might expect that where the largest
companies were convicted, and did not receive the more lenient deferred
and non-prosecution agreements, that perhaps prosecutors had stronger
cases or more evidence of intentional or high-level conduct, and there-
fore insisted on a conviction. It is no light matter for prosecutors to de-
cide to secure a conviction against a public company, and yet even in
those cases individuals were not typically prosecuted.
124 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, supra note 53, at tbl.C, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2013/Table 1 3.pdf.
125 See infra notes 183-84 (citing relevant statutes and noting the intent requirement).126 Mendelsohn Says Criminal Bribery Prosecutions Doubled in 2007, 22 Corp. Crime Rep.
36 (2008), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/mendelsohn09l608.htm, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8MQG-792R.
127 See Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 96.
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B. Prior Research on White-Collar Prosecutions
Far too little is known about the relationship between federal individ-
ual and corporate prosecutions. Cases involving both individuals and en-
tities are not necessarily jointly docketed in the federal case management
system. No official data are kept on the question of when and whether
individuals are prosecuted alongside a corporation. Given the underlying
lack of case tracking of such relationships, the question has been a diffi-
cult one for scholars to study. What made this study possible was the
fact that these deferred and non-prosecution agreements were so heavily
dominated by high-profile matters, including prosecutions of public cor-
porations, and news reports could be readily searched for information
concerning individuals charged with crimes. More run-of-the-mill cor-
porate crimes by small or family businesses would raise serious difficul-
ties in obtaining information about whether any individuals were
charged.
More fundamentally, data on "white-collar" prosecutions of individu-
als, or corporate or business crimes by individuals, do not exist. The cat-
egory of "white-collar" offenses is sociological and not legal, and even
within criminology scholarship there is no agreement on what constitute
white-collar offenses. 2 8 The Department of Justice's own imperfect cat-
egorization of white-collar crime does not include, for example, RICO,
corruption offenses, and others that can sometimes be very much busi-
ness-related. At the same time, as noted, fraud prosecutions are also a
highly imperfect proxy, where they may range from minor welfare
cheating to major Wall Street securities frauds.
It is clear, however, that far more individuals are prosecuted for
white-collar offenses each year in cases in which no company is prose-
cuted. At most, two hundred or so organizations are prosecuted in feder-
al court in a given year, and the number of prosecuted organizations has
been declining. In contrast, there are many thousands of individuals
prosecuted for white-collar related or business crimes.
The number of federal fraud convictions rose between 1996 and 2012
from about 6,000 cases per year to over 8,000 cases per year, though
they fell as a percentage of the federal docket. In fiscal 2014, fewer than
7,000 people were convicted of fraud in federal court, a drop from 2012
128 For a discussion, see Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 87-88.
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when over 8,500 people were convicted of fraud.12 9 In addition, average
fraud sentences nearly doubled during that time, reflecting sentencing
enhancements by Congress and perhaps the increased seriousness of
cases brought. (The sentences are highly variable, however, and judges
often grant more-lenient fraud sentences than the sentencing guidelines
call for.)130 No good data are kept on how many of those cases are high-
er-ups versus lower-level actors or in how many cases there was a poten-
tial case to be brought against the organization itself. The Department of
Justice has occasionally reported on its successes in holding higher-ups
accountable, although without clearly explaining where its figures come
from; one such DOJ report stated that between 2002 and 2008, the
members of its Corporate Fraud Task Force prosecuted 200 CEOs, more
than 120 vice presidents, and 50 CFOs.' 3 1
Presumably, under the strict respondeat superior standard, many thou-
sands of those individuals were employees working in the scope of their
employment, and corporate prosecutions could potentially have been
brought. The fewer than 200 organizational prosecutions brought each
year may be the remnant of the many times more cases declined or
simply not pursued against corporations.
Prior work has examined the question of individual and corporate
criminal responsibility by looking at corporate prosecutions of particular
types and in prior time periods (which themselves reflect different en-
forcement priorities and approaches). Professor Kathleen Brickey pur-
sued an ongoing study of corporate fraud prosecutions, and in examining
cases brought from March 2002 through January 2006, found that "the
129 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2012 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.3
(2013), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-
and-sourcebooks/2012/Table03.pdf (stating that 8,634 offenders, or over 10% of the federal
criminal docket, consisted of fraud convicts). For a classic study of individual white-collar
prosecutions in the federal system, see David Weisburd et al., Crimes of the Middle Classes:
White-Collar Offenders in the Federal Courts 104-06 (1991).
130 U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report on the Continuing Impact of United States v. Booker
on Federal Sentencing 6, 67 (2012); U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Final Report on the Impact of
United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing 75 (2006); Samuel W. Buell, Is the White
Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 Duke L.J. 823, 838-40 (2014) [hereinafter Buell, Is the
White Collar Offender Privileged?]. As Buell noted, "particularly in the last several years, it
has become common for a federal district judge to impose a sentence of imprisonment on a
white collar offender that is measured in double-digit years, and not infrequently in dec-
ades." Id. at 835; see also Samuel W. Buell, Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting
Fraud, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1611, 1645-46 (2007) (discussing below-guidelines sentencing).
131 Corp. Fraud Task Force, Office of the Deputy Att'y Gen., Report to the President, at iii
(2008), available at www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/corporate-fraud2008.pdf.
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corporate fraud prosecution cycle following Enron's collapse has pro-
duced an unparalleled number of criminal trials of senior corporate ex-
ecutives in just three years." 32 Professor Brickey found that forty-six de-
fendants went to trial, of which twelve were CEOs, COOs, professors,
chairmen of the board, or senior partners; however, in those trials, eight-
een were convicted, eleven were acquitted, and fifteen involved dead-
locked juries.'3 3 However, in addition to those forty-six cases Professor
Brickey studied, seventy-three defendants pleaded guilty.13 4 That pat-
tern, focusing just on the large corporate fraud cases post-Enron, is quite
similar to the larger pattern observed across deferred and non-
prosecution agreements after 2001.
A study in the mid-1970s by Professors Marshall Clinard and Peter
Yeager, focusing on the 582 largest publicly owned corporations in the
United States, found that, accompanying those federal enforcement ef-
forts (both civil and criminal), only sixteen individual corporate employ-
ees or officers served prison sentences, averaging only thirty-seven
days. 3 5 However, there may be far more prosecutions of officers or em-
ployees of smaller firms, where owners or higher-ups may be closely in-
volved. Moreover, the largest public companies were then dominated by
manufacturing companies.1 36 This may not reflect the types of public
companies (or the types of regulations and crimes) most prominent to-
day. Clinard and Yeager did explore in detail, however, the difficulty in
specifying legal responsibility "due to the division of tasks within a cor-
poration," and where "corporate violations are usually far more complex
than conventional crimes.""' Clinard and Yeager also found that
measures of firm and industry "were not strong predictors of corporate
violations" and instead that something about corporate culture or envi-
ronment must have played a role.'3 8 I take up those themes in the next
Part.
132 Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 221, 246 (2004); Kathleen
F. Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
397, 401, 419 (2006) [hereinafter Brickey, In Enron's Wake].
133 Brickey, In Enron's Wake, supra note 132, at 406-07.
134 Id. at 403.
13s Marshall B. Clinard et al., U.S. Dept. of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Admin.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Illegal Corporate Behavior, at xxii, 208-209 (1979).
136 Id. at xvii (describing how of the 582 public companies studied, 477 were manufactur-
" Id. at xxii.
11I&, at xxiii
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A study by Professor Mark Cohen in the late 1980s found that, in six-
ty-five percent of non-antitrust-related federal corporate prosecutions,
individuals were prosecuted. 139 Looking at such categories of non-public
companies raises real challenges, however, because there may not be
news reports regarding whether individuals were prosecuted, and the in-
dividual prosecutions may often not be jointly docketed with the prose-
cution of the company.
Apart from such archival empirical research, of the type conducted in
this Article as well, still other researchers have also examined theoretical
models of corporate offending, by focusing on sanctions and deterrence
inside and outside the firm, and on normative and moral factors that may
affect individuals. 140 Some argue that corporate executives may be par-
ticularly sensitive to sanctions that would affect their reputations.14 1 As
Professor Dan Kahan put it, your average corporate executive "probably
cares a lot about what his family, his colleagues, his firm's customers,
his neighbors, and even the members of his health club think." 4 2 How-
ever, sanctioning individuals may not be enough; the view of prosecu-
tors in the United States has been that altering corporate culture and
practices is also important to preventing business crime.
II. EXPLAINING INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS
In a recent speech, delivered shortly before announcing his retire-
ment, then-Attorney General Eric Holder spoke on financial fraud pros-
ecutions generally, and underscored, "we have almost always reserved
the right to continue our civil and criminal investigations into individual
executives at the respective firms."1 43 That much is borne out by my
139 Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice
in the Federal Courts, 1988-1990, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 247, 268 (1991).
140 For a survey of the research and a discussion of the role of moral considerations, see
Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a
Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 Law & Soc'y Rev. 549 (1996); see also, e.g.,
Gilbert Geis & Joseph DiMento, Should We Prosecute Corporations and/or Individuals?, in
Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates 72, 79 (Frank Pearce & Laureen Snider eds., 1995)
(discussing moral and hierarchical pressures on employees).
141 See, e.g., Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Of-
fenders 247 (1983); Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Cor-
porate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & Econ. 489, 493 (1999).
142 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 643
(1996).
143 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial
Fraud Prosecutions at NYU School of Law (Sept. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Holder, Remarks on
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analysis of the terms of these corporate prosecution agreements (at least
outside of the antitrust context, and Holder's subject in the speech was
financial fraud). Holder cited to the DOJ's statistics concerning mort-
gage fraud prosecutions, although then noting that
when it comes to more complex transactions that involve more sophis-
ticated traders - as opposed to run-of-the-mill "liar loan" cases or out-
and-out Ponzi schemes - a criminal prosecution of an individual can
be difficult, more complicated, to mount. This is true for any number
of reasons - from possible advice-of-counsel defenses; to the adequa-
cy or inadequacy of written disclosures; to the difficulty to establish
materiality and intent. And in some instances, it is simply not possible
to establish knowledge of a particular scheme on the part of a high-
ranking executive who is far removed from a firm's day-to-day opera-
tions.1 44
White-collar defense lawyers offer a different view; they have tended to
complain that few prosecutions of individuals occur because
"[p]rosecutors do not possess the same kind of leverage over individuals
that they do over companies.. . . [I]ndividuals are more likely to test the
prosecution's case."1 45 The claim that individuals are less risk averse and
more likely to risk a trial is highly debatable; individuals settle their cas-
es and plead guilty in the same overwhelming fashion as do corpora-
tions, and individuals face jail time. However, as the sections that follow
explain, there are real obstacles when bringing individual prosecutions
for corporate crimes. The obstacles flow from the complexity of large
organizations, where responsibilities are divided, authority is diffuse,
specialists and lawyers will provide advice and may provide assurances
of legality, and individual accountability is harder to obtain.
A. Organizational Complexity
A rising chorus of voices has criticized the failure to prosecute privi-
leged white-collar offenders. Yet employees should not be in the same
privileged position that their employers are in. Following the Supreme
Court's ruling in Upjohn Co. v. United States, the corporation retains at-
Financial Fraud], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attomey-general-holder-
remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law.
144 Id.
145 Matthew Fishbein, Why Individuals Aren't Prosecuted for Conduct Companies Admit,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 2014, at 4.
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torney-client and work product privilege, and therefore can decide
whether to waive it when cooperating with regulators and prosecutors.1 4 6
If employees speak to the corporation's lawyers during an internal inves-
tigation, they may incriminate themselves, and the company may want
to turn them in to show how it is cleaning house and cooperating fully
with prosecutors.1 4 7 However, if employees refuse to speak to corporate
counsel, then the company can fire them; many companies have "talk or
walk" policies, and understandably do not tolerate uncooperative em-
ployee behavior.1 4 8 Complaints were raised for years that federal prose-
cutors and DOJ policy had created a "culture of waiver," 49 although, as
I have described elsewhere, most corporate prosecution agreements have
not included an explicit privilege waiver.so Quite apart from access to
information, individuals may have spoken to lawyers or accountants and
received advice that their planned conduct was legal. Such evidence may
not be an outright defense to a crime like fraud in which intent to de-
fraud must be shown, but it may be strong evidence of "good faith" con-
duct.
Organizational complexity may be one particular challenge in corpo-
rate prosecutions and one sound reason to focus on the corporation ra-
ther than individuals. Attorney General Holder explained, "Responsibil-
ity remains so diffuse, and top executives so insulated, that any
misconduct could again be considered more a symptom of the institu-
tion's culture than a result of the willful actions of any single individu-
al.""' Organizational complexity may be precisely the source of the
criminality. Criminologists suggest that corporate fraud is often a "team
sport" and the product of "group-think" or the culture within an organi-
146 449 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1981).
147 Garrett, supra note 31, at 940.
148 Charles Gasparino, Merril Fires a Vice Chairman for Refusal to Testify on Enron, Wall
St. J. (Sept. 19, 2002, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl032380350579468595.
149 Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 92 (2007); Sam-
uel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1613, 1619 (2007); Lisa
Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311, 316 (2007); Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 295, 299-300 (2008).
150 See Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 92.
151 See Holder, Remarks on Financial Fraud, supra note 143.
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zation.5 2 Socialization within an organization can create pressure
against breaking ranks and raising questions.1"' The corporate culture
may be most to blame, and punishing the entity may result in the very
changes that can best do away with that culture.
Moreover, organizational complexity can obscure fault. It may be
quite clear that some employees and officers approved a misleading fi-
nancial statement, but sorting out who knew what and when, where doz-
ens each signed the relevant reports and statements, could be a frustrat-
ing if not impossible task. Attorney General Holder further explained,
Many financial criminals are savvy enough to avoid using email,
which may leave a trail for investigators to follow. And intent may on-
ly be evidenced sometimes in the form of verbal instructions - evi-
dence that can provide the sort of "smoking gun" that is needed to se-
cure a conviction, but that can only be attained from a cooperating
witness. 154
If this were conduct designed ultimately to benefit the corporation,
then perhaps the corporation itself would be punished and should reme-
dy the harm. As Judge.Gerald E. Lynch has put it well, corporate sanc-
tions, and perhaps corporate prosecution alone, are justified "when the
corporate form makes it difficult to establish culpability on the part of
any particular individual."
One response to corporate complexity would be to treat the entity as a
"collective," where one need not examine whether any single employee
had the requisite mens rea. Only one court has considered a "collective
knowledge" theory under which partial crimes by more than one em-
ployee might result in corporate criminal liability, and in a case in which
that theory need not have been, arguably, relied upon (other courts have
considered such a theory in civil cases).15 6 Such a theory might help to
152 Sridhar Ramamoorti, The Psychology and Sociology of Fraud: Integrating the Behav-
ioral Sciences Component into Fraud and Forensic Accounting Curricula, 23 Issues Acct.
Educ. 521, 529 (2008).
153 James William Coleman, The Criminal Elite: Understanding White-Collar Crime 194-
99 4th ed. 1998).
1 See Holder, Remarks on Financial Fraud, supra note 143.
155 Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 23, 51 (1997).
156 United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st Cir. 1987). For a court
adopting the theory in a civil case, see In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d
472, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). But see Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, 365 F.3d
353, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2004).
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hold a company accountable where individual responsibility is unclear-
but holding the company accountable is not the primary challenge. De-
ferred and non-prosecution agreements, as well as plea agreements, can
permit the company to accept responsibility without litigation about
which employees did what at trial. Understandably, few companies take
the risk of challenging a prosecution case at trial. A collective
knowledge theory, however, would not help to hold individual employ-
ees responsible.
B. Prosecutorial Reluctance or Resources
As a matter of policy, as noted in the Introduction, the Department of
Justice emphasizes in its principles that prosecution of the corporation,
even a corporate guilty plea, is no substitute for prosecution of individu-
als. The DOJ's Antitrust Division does give outright leniency deals to
both corporations and employees as part of settlements with corpora-
tions that are the first to cooperate. Such antitrust immunity agreements,
to corporations that turn in other members of a price-fixing cartel, may
include a promise not to prosecute cooperating employees, but prosecu-
tors also "carve out" and prosecute those employees who do not cooper-
ate, and particularly the high-level ones.'57 In the antitrust setting, prose-
cutors do not try to accomplish structural reform or rehabilitate
companies: They want to strictly deter wrongdoing and incentivize indi-
viduals and companies to turn in the entire group of companies engaged
in a price-fixing conspiracy. Indeed, those immunity deals are kept con-
fidential and, as a result, they do not appear in the collection of corpo-
rate non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements. Whether an
optimal balance is obtained in the antitrust area regarding individual and
corporate liability raises complex questions in that area. It has been
much debated in academic and policy circles, in part because, as Profes-
sors John Connor and Robert Lande have described, it is often lower-
15 Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Criminal Enforcement, Antitrust
Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Address at the Annual American Bar Association Section of Anti-
trust Law Spring Meeting: Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in Corporate Plea
Negotiations 7-8 (Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/measuring-
value-second-cooperation-corporate-plea-negotiations. The Antitrust Division has altered its
approach towards "carve-outs" in recent years. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, State-
ment of Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer on Changes to Antitrust Division's Carve-Out
Practice Regarding Corporate Plea Agreements (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/
statement-assistant-attorney-general-bill-baer-changes-antitrust-division-s-carve-out.
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level employees who may "take a bullet for the team" by pleading guilty
and serving a prison term only to be subsequently re-hired or even re-
warded by the firm or industry." 8 Outside of antitrust, no other setting,
however, involves such a hard-nosed and clearly defined approach to
corporate prosecutions and their relationship with individual prosecu-
tions.
Outside the antitrust setting, not only is there no fixed policy on when
and whether employees and officers will be prosecuted, but I have also
found very few deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements that
explicitly discuss employee prosecutions. To be sure, the agreements, as
noted, routinely state that cooperation of the company in individual in-
vestigations will be required. But it is never clear whether any such in-
vestigations are actually anticipated.
One exception was an agreement in the AmSouth Bancorp case,
which said that if the firm complied, then "the United States will not
prosecute any current or former AmSouth employee based upon any of
the conduct described."l 5 9 One suspects, however, that more agreements
involve tacit agreements not to prosecute individual employees. Any
such non-prosecution agreements, in the nature of declinations, would
likely not be public documents.
Federal Judge Jed Rakoff has argued that prosecutors conduct overly
hasty investigations, settling with the corporation on lenient terms that
impose "internal compliance measures that are often little more than
window-dressing." 6 0 That story jibes with patterns observed in the data.
Not only do most deferred and non-prosecution agreements fail to care-
fully specify compliance reforms to be adopted, but also most are not
accompanied by individual prosecutions. At press conferences announc-
ing corporate prosecutions, such as at the Toyota deferred prosecution
agreement press conference, prosecutors have stated that no individual
prosecutions were contemplated. And yet the text of corporate agree-
ments unfailingly requires that the company fully cooperate in ongoing
investigations of culpable individuals. To be sure, in some cases, a re-
158 John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy: Crime
Pays, Cardozo L. Rev. 427, 437-442 (2012) (discussing criticism of focus on individual
penalties in antitrust context, including those by an OECD policy roundtable, and describing
outcomes for employees convicted in cartel prosecutions).
59 Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 18, United States v. AmSouth Bancorp., No. 04-167
(S.D. Miss. Oct. 12, 2004).
160 Rakoff, supra note 28, at 11.
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markable investment would have to be put into identifying wrongdoers
within a complex organization and pursuing expensive litigation of those
cases. That these cases are hard fought and can result in high-profile ac-
quittals or dismissals may also give prosecutors some pause before con-
sidering going beyond the settlement with the corporation to pursue in-
dividual officers and employees. Perhaps priorities are slowly changing;
in more recent speeches, as noted, DOJ officials have highlighted the
importance of "true" cooperation that provides "evidence against" the
"culpable individuals."l6 '
C. Defense Resources
There has been a rise in substantial white-collar practices at large law
firms, accompanying the rise in the size of corporate criminal prosecu-
tions (if not the number of such prosecutions).1 62 Many of these individ-
ual cases described involved prosecution losses; one could attribute
some of this to defense resources and effectiveness. White-collar prose-
cutions can also take quite a bit of time. For example, prosecutions of
former Enron employees were ongoing well into the next set of corpo-
rate scandals. Most prominently, former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling
was not sentenced until 2006; he claimed at sentencing, "I am innocent
of every one of these charges," and his appeals ultimately resulted in a
ten-year reduction in his sentence in 2013.163
To be sure, prosecutors can in some respects leverage the defense re-
sources of the corporation against those of the individuals. As described,
they can obtain prosecution agreements in which the company agrees to
fully cooperate and turn over documents, interview records, and the
fruits of its internal investigations into the employee conduct. That said,
prosecutors have been leery of demanding that a company waive attor-
ney-client or work product privilege, as well as demanding that a com-
pany cease reimbursing individual legal bills. When prosecutors ap-
161 Miller, supra note 32.
162 Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 5; Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law's
Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Finns,
53 Ariz. L. Rev. 1221, 1221 (2011).
"' Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 373, 375 (2010); Kristen Hays, Skilling Maintains
Innocence, Vows Appeal, Hous. Chron., Oct. 24, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.chron.com/
business/enron/article/Skilling-maintains-innocence-vows-appeal-1876814.php; Peter Lattman,
Ex-Enron Chief's Sentence Is Cut by 10 Years, to 14, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2013, at B2, available
at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/21/prison-sentence-of-ex-enron-ceo-skilling-cut-by-10-
years-2.
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peared to have been encouraging KPMG to waive privilege and refuse to
pay employee legal bills, they were widely criticized and many of the
individual prosecutions were later thrown out by a federal district judge,
who cited constitutional concerns with the prosecution's conduct.'6 At
the time, DOJ guidelines noted that cooperation would be an important
factor in deciding whether to prosecute a company, and that prosecutors
would consider whether the company was supporting "culpable employ-
ees" by "advancing of attorney's fees" or not making "witnesses availa-
ble" and disclosing "the complete results" of an internal investigation.16 5
Prosecutors have as a result altered policy in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual
and backed off from trying to use their influence over the company to
undercut defense representation resources.16 That said, companies still
have quite a bit to gain by cooperating with prosecutors and identifying
who was responsible for committing the crimes in question.16 1
There is also the possibility that corporations can exercise other types
of influence to discourage prosecutions of their employees. Some fear
that they influence prosecutors by hiring former colleagues as defense
counsel, or by obtaining audiences at the highest levels of the Depart-
ment of Justice during negotiations with prosecutors. Given contrary in-
centives of prosecutors to obtain high-profile victories in white-collar
cases, these fears of undue influence may not have much explanatory
power.
164 For a lengthy description of the KPMG case and its aftermath, see Garrett, Too Big to
Jail, supra note 5, at 88-100, 112-16; see also United States v. Stein (Stein III), 541 F.3d 130,
146-51 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Stein (Stein l), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 420-24 (S.D.N.Y.
2007); United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 356-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Garrett,
supra note 3 1, at 926-30. Draft legislation was proposed in response to the perceived problem.
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3.
165 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, supra note 51.6 The DOJ announced the first set of changes to that policy in 2005. Memorandum from
Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't
Components & U.S. Att'ys 1 (Oct. 21, 2005), http://federalevidence.com/pdf/CorpProsec/
McCallum. Memo_10.. 21 05.pdf. Additional changes were made in 2006 and again in 2008.
Memorandum from Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't
Components & U.S. Att'ys 13 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf; Memorandum from Paul J.
McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S.
Att'ys 8-11 & n.3 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/
le acy/2007/07/05/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
7 George M. Cohen, Essay, Of Coerced Waiver, Government Leverage, and Corporate
Loyalty: The Holder, Thompson, and McNulty Memos and Their Critics, 93 Va. L. Rev. In
Brief 153, 162 (2007).
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How could prosecutors and regulators, as well as investigators who
pursue corporate crime, be provided with more resources? Professor
Mary Kreiner Ramirez proposes that a Corporate Crimes Division be
created at the Department of Justice.168 The existing Financial Fraud En-
forcement Task Force coordinates prosecutions and policy among regu-
lators and individual U.S. Attorney's Offices; 169 perhaps providing
greater resources to that group, to a new entity, and to the regulators and
investigators would all have a real impact. Proposals to further centralize
corporate crime enforcement authority at DOJ, however, may not be ad-
visable, and may not generate resources that are not already available;
such efforts could even dilute resources or hinder effective enforce-
ment.170 Given that regulators such as the SEC annually go hat in hand
to Congress complaining of inadequate enforcement and investigation
resources, new proposals may continue to fall on deaf ears. In other are-
as, such as the Antitrust and the Environment and Natural Resources Di-
visions, resource constraints may not be such a problem.
D. Mens Rea and Weak Prosecution Cases
Corporate deferred and non-prosecution agreements presumably re-
flect a settlement and a compromise across multiple dimensions. One
reason for prosecutors to settle a case is that they are unsure of a trial
victory. Lacking sufficient evidence to be sure of a corporate conviction
could similarly mean that prosecutors are unsure whether they can con-
vict individuals-as we have seen, when they do prosecute individuals,
they do sometimes fail to secure convictions. However, one is also con-
cerned that in these corporate prosecutions, the requisite investigation is
1 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task
Force to Top Priority, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 1001-09 (2010). For a general examination of
how institutional design can shape prosecution policy and practice, see Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61
Stan. L. Rev. 869, 895-906 (2009).
169 Exec. Ord. No. 13,519, 3 C.F.R. 271 (2015) (creating Financial Fraud Enforcement
Task Force in place of the preexisting Corporate Fraud Task Force). For other federal prose-
cution task forces related to corporate crime, see, for example, Press Release, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Corporate Fraud: Options Cases Aim for Level Field (Feb. 14, 2007),
htt s://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2007/february/options 021407.
0 For criticism of efforts to centralize policy or enforcement authority at Main Justice,
and the perverse consequences of such efforts, see Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal
Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757, 757
(1999); Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Look-
ing Forward, 58 Duke L.J. 2087, 2087 (2009).
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not conducted to assess whether individual cases could be brought, even
if the case against the company is best settled.
The chief obstacle in organizational cases can be the complexity of
the organization, in which intent can be hard to show where responsibili-
ties are diffuse and shared. For example, the HSBC case has attracted
substantial attention due to the lack of employee prosecutions and the
deferred prosecution agreement received by the bank; the federal judge
that eventually approved the agreement noted "the heavy public criti-
cism" of it.17 ' The case was one of the largest money laundering and
sanctions-violations cases in U.S. history. The bank admitted to failures
to implement effective anti-money-laundering programs to monitor
transactions from Mexico, and as a result billions of dollars, including at
least $881 million in drug trafficking proceedings, passed through its
bank; other failures around the world resulted in approximately $660
million in payments processed to regimes in Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan,
and Myanmar, for which such transactions are barred by international
sanctions.172 Trillions of dollars in transactions had been flagged and not
reviewed.'
In settling the case with HSBC, which paid almost $2 billion in forfei-
ture and fines, the Government described an "institution-wide lack of
accountability," efforts to "freeze" staffing levels in the compliance di-
vision, resulting in a "staffing crisis," and outright efforts to discourage
requests for more compliance resources, including "a policy not to con-
duct due diligence on other HSBC Group Affiliates."l 7 4 The statement of
'" United States v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 12-763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
July 1, 2013) (citing, for example, Jesse Singal, HSBC Report Should Result in Prosecu-
tions, Not Just Fines, Say Critics, The Daily Beast (July 18, 2012, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/18/hsbc-report-should-result-in-prosecutions-
not-just-fines-say-critics.html; Matt Taibbi, Gangster Bankers: Too Big to Jail, Rolling Stone
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/gangster-bankers-too-big-to-jail-
20130214; Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2012, at A38, available at
htt://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html).
2 HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *8-9.
'7 Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of
Money Laundering, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2012, at Al, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-money-laundering.
174 Id.; see also Government's Memorandum in Support of the Deferred Prosecution
Agreement at 7, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013)
(referring to staffing); Statement of Facts ¶¶ 25, 28, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, No.
12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012), available at
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution-agreements/sites/default/files/pdf/HSBC_1.pd
f(referring to staffing issues).
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facts incorporated in the deferred prosecution agreement described con-
duct by particular employees. For example, a "senior executive" de-
scribed that anti-money-laundering efforts had "gone down the hole in
the past 18 months."175 The HSBC "head of compliance" admitted that
in its Mexican subsidiary, there was "no recognizable compliance or
money-laundering function." 7 As suspicious activity mounted in Mexi-
co, a senior compliance officer at HSBC Mexico argued to supervisors
that they could not "keep rubber-stamping unacceptable risks merely be-
cause someone on the business side writes a nice letter. . . . We have
seen this movie before, and it ends badly."'77 Regarding payments that
violated international sanctions, red flags were raised for years. For ex-
ample, a head of compliance argued that HSBC's practices "could pro-
vide the basis for an action ... for breach of sanctions," but was told that
due to "significant business opportunities," the procedure should contin-
ue.' 7 ' These were not faceless compliance failures, but concerns regard-
ing illegality were raised by people and were dismissed out of hand by
superiors, who were themselves not prosecuted.
Far more information was revealed when a U.S. Senate Subcommittee
on Investigations conducted hearings resulting in a detailed report on the
case, than had been revealed in the statement of facts accompanying the
deferred prosecution agreement.1 79 Emails described how employees had
brought problematic transactions to their supervisors regarding possible
terrorist organizations, and had been told things like, "I should fire you
right now," and "Are you out of your f- mind," and telling the
head of compliance, when complaining about insufficient staff and re-
sources, that her comments were "inappropriate," and then firing her.'s
Among others, Senator Jeff Merkley objected to the deferred prosecu-
tion agreement that the bank HSBC received for violations of banking
regulations by citing a still larger problem that has occupied much pub-
175 Statement of Facts, supra note 174, 128.
176 Id. ¶¶ 29-30.
'7Id. ¶34.
Id. 66.
7 Press Release, S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial
System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist Financing Risks (July 16, 2012), http://www.hsg
ac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbc-exposed-us-finacial-system-to-money-
laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks.
18o Staff of S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, supra note 119, at 27-28;
Carrick Mollenkamp & Brett Wolf, Special Report: HSBC's Money-Laundering Crackdown
Riddled with Lapses, Reuters (July 13, 2012, 8:59 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
07/14/us-hsbc-compliance-delaware-idUSBRE86C18H20120714.
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lic attention: "[F]our years after the financial crisis, the Department ap-
pears to have firmly set the precedent that no bank, bank employee, or
bank executive can be prosecuted."18' And at the time, Senator Elizabeth
Warren put it this way:
[I]f you're caught with an ounce of cocaine, the chances are good you
are going to jail. If it happens repeatedly, you may go to jail for the
rest of your life. But evidently, if you launder nearly $1 billion for
drug cartels and violate our international sanctions, your company
pays a fine and you go home and sleep in your own bed at
night ... .182
The HSBC prosecution agreement had detailed an endemic lack of com-
pliance across the bank's operations, including at central compliance de-
partments and not just far-flung subsidiaries. Yet in the biggest such
money-laundering and sanctions case in U.S. history, no officers or em-
ployees were prosecuted for their roles.
Then-Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer offered this explana-
tion why: "As bad as HSBC's conduct was, this is not a case where the
HSBC people intended-intended-to create money laundering."' The
suggestion was that the problem involved the difficulty of proving the
intent of individuals working at the bank (perhaps putting to one side in-
dividuals working at foreign subsidiaries). Should we credit such a
statement? Was that the best that the DOJ could offer, and should it be
obligated, as a matter of policy and practice at least, to say more when
such serious violations go unpunished at the individual level? The calcu-
lus in such cases cannot simply be reduced to the difficulty of proving
intent. Presumably it also involved practical considerations, negotiations
with the bank itself, and the potential gains from targeting employees.
As I have described, the HSBC case was no aberration. Bank employees
simply are not prosecuted when the bank settles a prosecution for such
1' Press Release, Senator Jeff Merkley, supra note 122.
182 Patterns of Abuse: Assessing Bank Secrecy Act Compliance and Enforcement Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (state-
ment of Sen. Elizabeth Warren).
183 James O'Toole, HSBC: Too Big to Jail?, CNN (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:08 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/12/news/companies/hsbc-money-laundering. Amendments to
the Bank Secrecy Act in 1994, reacting to Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994),
made clear prosecutors need only show action taken "for the purpose of evading the report-
ing requirements," rather than requiring "that the defendant knew that structuring was ille-
gal." 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a), 5324(a) (1994); H.R. Rep. No. 103-438, at 22 (1994).
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money laundering-related charges. To be sure, only the bank itself is ob-
ligated to satisfy Bank Secrecy Act provisions requiring the "financial
institution" itself to adopt adequate anti-money laundering controls.'84
But any number of other crimes could be charged if employees engaged
in money laundering, made false statements, concealed illegal transac-
tions, or approved fraudulent transactions. Can it be that there was never
the ability to show intent? And what about non-money laundering
charges: Could it be that no employees committed other forms of fraud,
or the same Bank Secrecy Act violations that the bank itself admitted
were committed? The heated public criticism of the HSBC agreement
should not have surprised the DOJ. One wonders whether the bank real-
ly did serve as a scapegoat in that case, and whether the same type of
calculus may commonly be conducted in other types of corporate crimi-
nal cases.18 1
From the outside it is very difficult to know, because corporate prose-
cution agreements are often not transparent and do not include detailed
statements of fact concerning the mens rea of the individual officers and
employees (the HSBC case is somewhat exceptional because we also
have publicly available the detailed results of the Senate Subcommittee
investigation). Not having to prove mens rea is a chief advantage of pur-
suing the corporation and not the individuals. Perhaps that is one reason
so many corporate prosecutions settle. Professor Henry W. Edgerton ob-
served long ago, in 1927, how "juries-as has long been notorious in
civil cases-are not so reluctant to find corporations guilty as to find in-
dividuals guilty." 86
The deferred and non-prosecution agreements are dominated by fraud
prosecutions (wire fraud, securities fraud, mail fraud, as well as tax
fraud and health care fraud) in which mens rea may pose an obstacle.18 7
Fraud does require proof of intent to engage in a scheme to defraud, alt-
hough intent to defraud can be proven circumstantially; as the D.C. Cir-
cuit has put it, "The requisite intent under the federal mail and wire
fraud statutes may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances and
184 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012) ("[E]ach financial institution shall establish anti-
money laundering programs. . .
185 See supra Section I.B.
186 Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate Criminal Responsibility, 36 Yale L.J. 827, 834 (1927).
187 On challenges of detecting and deterring corporate fraud more broadly, see Miriam H.
Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1295, 1341-42 (2008).
For a richer theory of complex commercial frauds, see Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal
Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1971, 1974-75 (2006).
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need not be proven by direct evidence." U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara
summarized the finger pointing that typically occurs in white-collar
prosecutions well:
This guy's going to testify, "My accountant's a smart guy -I just re-
lied on my accountant." The accountant's going to say, "I just relied
on what he gave me," and everyone has plausible deniability. That's a
simple example of a way in which people can get away with even
criminal activity when they're making false certifications to the gov-
emment. 89
Due to the lack of transparency of the corporate agreements, and the un-
derlying complexity of the conduct itself, critics of the failure to prose-
cute mortgage fraud following the Global Financial Crisis cannot easily
say whether prosecutors were right or wrong to claim that proving inten-
tional fraud simply posed too many challenges. Perhaps more forceful
investigations could have turned up smoking gun evidence of intent to
defraud. Or perhaps these were sophisticated actors who could point fin-
gers at each other, or their lawyers, or their accountants, or their risk
managers, or others, just like in U.S. Attorney Bharara's pithy example.
The problem returns us to the problem of organizational complexity.
Indeed, observers of some of the most high-profile trials, such as the tri-
al of HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy, in which he was acquitted,
have highlighted the sheer complexity of the indictment, the length of
the trial itself (five months), the necessity of relying on testimony of
other executives who had pleaded guilty, and "the lack of a paper trial
directly linking Scrushy to the fraud."' 90 Prosecutors can certainly try to
make cases less complex for jurors; some believe that explains outcomes
in the Tyco case, at which CEO Dennis Kozlowski and CFO Mark
Swartz had a mistrial, but they were convicted at a more streamlined
"short and sweet" second trial.19' A more concise explanation of com-
188 United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1979); U.S. Attorneys' Manual,
supra note 1, § 949.
George Packer, A Dirty Business, New Yorker, June 27, 2011, at 42, available at http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/06/27/a-dirty-business.
190 Brickey, In Enron's Wake, supra note 132, at 410-11; Reed Abelson & Jonathan
Glater, A Style That Connected with Hometown Jurors, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2005, at Cl.
191 Brickey, In Enron's Wake, supra note 132, at 409-11; Carrie Johnson, For Prosecutors,
Shorter Is Sweeter: Government Got Chance to Analyze, Fix Mistakes, Wash. Post, June 18,
2005, at Dl; Pete McEntegart, One Angry Man: A Juror Gives an Inside Account of Why
the Tyco Trial Fell Apart, Time, Apr. 12, 2004, at 47.
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plex criminality may help secure convictions at cases that go to trial, but
that does not address the difficulty of uncovering sufficient evidence to
proceed to trial in the first instance.
E. Massive Misdemeanors
What if the corporate crime did not involve a fraud or a crime in
which intent must be shown, but rather a strict liability offense? In con-
trast to fraud prosecutions, in areas in which the offenses are strict liabil-
ity or regulatory offenses, such as for some environmental crimes, or
immigration crimes, or certain food and drug offenses, issues of proof
may be far more simplified and prosecuting both individuals and corpo-
rations would not pose the same obstacles. Such offenses would likely
be relatively easy to pursue against individuals, but would doing so be
worthwhile? Some very-large-scale corporate prosecutions may involve
conduct that for the individuals involved amounts to a misdemeanor or
regulatory violation.
The sheer scope of the harm involved may make the case one involv-
ing massive fines. One could see how in such a case, individual wrong-
doers would be unable to meaningfully contribute to the payment of the
appropriate penalties. Take the largest misdemeanor prosecutions of all
time: the Big Pharma settlements of misdemeanor pharmaceutical mis-
branding charges, such as the $1.3 billion guilty plea of Pfizer's subsidi-
ary Pharmacia & Upjohn in 2009.192 Would justice have better been
done if thousands of sales employees had been convicted of misdemean-
ors as well? Perhaps if they faced the more serious charges that Pfizer
and its subsidiary both avoided, because a non-misdemeanor would have
resulted in disbarment from Medicare and Medicaid that could have
harmed the public. 19 3 Only two sales managers were prosecuted in that
Pfizer case, and perhaps understandably, both received probation, argu-
ing that they were low-level individuals who were following orders of
192 See 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(1) (2012) ("Any person who violates a provision of section 331 of
this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or
both."); Plea Agreement at 2, 6, United States v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., No. 1:09-cr-10258-
DPW-1 (D. Mass. Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/plea.agree
ments/pdf/Pharmacia.pdf.
' 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006); Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG
Exclusion Authorities Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,676, 46,680
(Sept. 2, 1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1000, 1001, 1002, 1005).
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many levels of supervisors. 194 Prosecutors could have used such cases,
though, to work their way up the chain and hold higher-ups accountable.
Doing so would certainly add far more of a deterrent to such a misde-
meanor prosecution at the corporate subsidiary level.
But one would likely not feel as if justice is done if large numbers of
employees or even supervisors are prosecuted for truly misdemeanor vi-
olations, such as immigration violations, while the company pays the fi-
ne. Misdemeanor prosecutions would themselves not result in serious
punishments, and if the goals of the criminal statute are regulatory, then
the best course may be to pursue the public welfare-type offense against
the corporation, which is in the best position to pay the fine, compensate
victims, and adopt regulatory reforms. Corporations may be in the best
position to pay restitution to and compensate victims. Individuals may
not be able to pay sufficient fines, as discussed, and in the case of a
"massive misdemeanor," fines may be the most appropriate punishment.
F. Structural Reforms
Corporations can be rehabilitated, given the mutability and flexibility
of the organizational form, and a central goal of these prosecution
agreements is to secure the adoption of structural reforms. Managers can
be fired, new leadership can adopt compliance programs and governance
reforms, and independent monitors can review changes to policies and
practices.1 95 The structural reform of a leading company can set out a
model for industry and assist in broader efforts by regulators to promote
best practices to prevent violations from happening in the first in-
stance.19 6 Ideally, corporate prosecutions can serve those goals to pro-
mote ethics and compliance; in practice such efforts may be uncertain
and uneven.1 97 However, those are goals quite apart from individual
prosecutions.
194 Jim Edwards, Pfizer Exec: Company Approved of Off-Label Bextra Promotion, CBS
Moneywatch (June 22, 2009 5:15 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pfizer-exec-
company-approved-of-off-label-bextra-promotion; David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by
Promoting Drugs for Unapproved Uses, Bloomberg (Nov. 9, 2009, 12:01 AM),
htt ://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4yV1nYxCGoA.
See Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at ch. 10.
196 For early work describing a structural reform model for corporate prosecutions, as well
as its features and challenges, see Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va.
L. Rev. 853 (2007).
197 See Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at ch. 10; see also Miriam Hechler Baer,
Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 952-53, 966 (2009) (referring to
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Further, I am not convinced that taking those structural reform goals
seriously necessarily comes at the expense of pursuing individual prose-
cutions. Indeed, I argue, and develop further in the next Part, that some
means for securing more successful structural reforms, like specifying
governance terms of agreements, demanding that the company audit
compliance, imposing monitors, and seeking judicial supervision of im-
plementation of compliance, can be largely accomplished by delegating
structural reform to courts, monitors, and the company. Prosecutors
could then focus on what they do best: holding individuals accountable.
III. PRIORITIZING INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY
A range of reforms could improve the intersection of corporate and
individual criminal liability. I do not advocate still-broader definitions of
federal white-collar crimes; they are already quite broad and sentences
are already quite stiff. Instead, I focus on the discretion exercised by
prosecutors and the resources they require to undertake complex corpo-
rate investigations. First, I propose that longer statutes of limitations
provide more time for complex corporate investigations. Second, I pro-
pose changes to the Speedy Trial Act, to prevent deferred prosecution
agreements from being approved by judges should a company not coop-
erate by providing information regarding culpable individuals and their
conduct. Third, I describe how additional investigative resources could
assist the relevant enforcement agencies as well as prosecutions. Finally,
I describe how corporate prosecution agreements can themselves create
conditions that deter individual corporate crimes and enhance accounta-
bility within organizations.
A. Legislation to Improve Corporate Criminal Enforcement
What can be done to make corporate prosecutions more effective (and
more common)? Some argue that we simply need more-expansive fed-
eral criminal laws that can criminalize more business conduct. I agree
with federal criminal law scholars who view the answer as not to broad-
en white-collar crimes to make negligent business decisions or negligent
compliance); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1386, 1393-94 (1999) (referring to compliance and
ethics); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159, 164-67 (2008) (referring to
deferred prosecutions).
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supervision at financial institutions crimes. Despite policy and constitu-
tional concerns, some have recommended as much.1 9 8 Professors Sam
Buell and Peter Henning have elegantly dissected the shortcomings of
such approaches.' 99 Federal crimes are already quite broad, including
federal fraud and other key crimes commonly charged against corpora-
tions. To be sure, it is a separate question whether there should have
been prosecutions for risk-taking behavior preceding the Global Finan-
cial Crisis in 2007 and 2008. In cases in which corporations were prose-
cuted, and in which prosecutors have concluded that crimes were com-
mitted, critics are right to ask why prosecutors have not named who in
particular committed such crimes. As I have discussed, it is impossible
to know from the outsider's perspective to what degree undetected
crimes could have been uncovered. One potential way to enhance the
ability to target high-ups would be to expand the responsible corporate
officer doctrine beyond the limited settings in which it currently applies,
so that corporate officers would face strict but misdemeanor criminal li-
ability for supervising employees who committed federal crimes.200
What other statutory or policy changes could empower criminal pros-
ecutions for financial and corporate crimes? Perhaps a sustained invest-
ment in investigation resources and far larger teams of financial fraud
prosecutions could make the playing field more even. In other areas, if
there is a concern that regulatory enforcers and prosecutors do not have
adequate resources, we deputize and incentivize private attorneys gen-
eral. Businesses may very much resent the increased litigation that re-
sults, and perhaps there are dim hopes for such legislation, where if any-
thing, for example, Congress has acted to limit private securities
litigation. 20 1 However, the Dodd-Frank Act empowers whistleblowers in
various provisions, with accompanying regulations that may bring far
198 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Com-
ponent Heads and U.S. Att'ys (June 16, 1999) (on file with the author); Jeff Madrick &
Frank Partnoy, Should Some Bankers Be Prosecuted?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Nov. 10, 2011, at
23, 25-26; Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What's Inside America's Banks?, Atlantic,
Jan./Feb. 2013, at 60, 70-71.
199 See Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, supra note 130; Peter J. Henning,
The Debate over Wall St. Enforcement, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:58 AM), http://deal
book.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/the-debate-over-wall-st-enforcement.
2oo For a discussion of responsible corporate officer doctrine, see Garrett, Too Big to Jail,
supra note 5, at 109-10.
o0 On the ability of the financial industry to weaken financial reforms post-Global Finan-
cial Crisis, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giv-
ing in to Wall Street, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1289-91 (2013).
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more corporate misconduct to light.2 0 2 Below I detail proposals for fu-
ture legislation and policy changes that could similarly enhance the abil-
ity to bring corporate and individual prosecutions: (1) lengthening stat-
utes of limitations for financial crimes; (2) adding corporate-
prosecution-specific criteria for approval of deferred prosecution agree-
ments under the Speedy Trial Act; and (3) revised organizational sen-
tencing guidelines.
1. Statutes ofLimitations
Another policy change could be to lengthen statutes of limitations for
key corporate crimes, recognizing that such complex investigations re-
quire corporate cooperation over many years in order to unravel who did
what. Prosecutors have been reported to face real pressure to adequately
investigate cases in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, and have filed
civil charges with other statutes of limitations, facing the expiration of
the criminal limitations period.2 03 The new DOJ guidance on charging
individuals notes the problem of delays in corporate investigations, and
suggests making "all efforts" to charge culpable individuals within limi-
tations periods or to obtain a tolling agreement or court order tolling the
limitations period.2 04 The general federal statute of limitations is five
years. 205 The Savings and Loan Scandal in the late 1980s resulted in an
extension to seven years, from five years, of the Major Fraud Act of
1988, regarding federal procurement fraud.206 Congress expressed con-
cern that the "extraordinary complexity" of such procurement fraud cas-
es required more time for adequate investigation.207 Theft of a major
202 See Corporate Law-Securities Regulation-Congress Expands Incentives for Whis-
tieblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC., 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1829 (2011).
203 Jason M. Breslow, As Deadlines Look for Financial Crisis Cases, Prosecutors Weigh
Their Options, Frontline (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:40 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
business-economy-fmancial-crisis/untouchables/as-deadlines-loom-for-financial-crisis-cases-
prosecutors-weigh-their-options/.204 Yates Memo, supra note 33, at 6.
205 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2012) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person
shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is
found or the information is instituted within five years next after such offense shall have
been committed.").
206 18 U.S.C. § 1031(f) (2012); The Major Fraud Act, and the Government Fraud Law En-
forcement Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 3911 and S. 1958 Before the Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 100th Cong. 11 (1988) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).20 7 S. Rep. No. 100-503 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5969, 5970-71.
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artwork now brings with it a twenty-year statute of limitations.20 8 In
dictment of "John Doe" unknown defendants is permitted in cases in
which a felon's DNA profile is known; perhaps "John Doe" defendants
could be named within a statute of limitations where a corporation has
admitted to a crime, but no individuals have yet been specifically identi-
fied.209 Offenses that "affect[]" a financial institution, including fraud
and wire fraud that affect a financial institution, now have a ten-year
statute of limitations.2 10 An extension to a ten-year statute of limitations,
for example, could be drafted to include all offenses by or affecting or-
ganizations, whether they be financial institutions or other corporations
or partnerships. An extension could alternatively be drafted to include
all offenses involving actual or intended monetary loss or gain of over,
say, ten million dollars. Or longer, say, even fifteen-year statutes of limi-
tations could be adopted in specific areas, such as crimes involving fi-
nancial institutions, or cases involving public corporations and their sub-
sidiaries.
2. Speedy Trial Act Improvements
An additional policy change could target the decision to provide cor-
porations with deferred prosecution agreements. Under Title 18, United
States Code, Section 3161(h)(2) of the Speedy Trial Act, a judge may
defer the prosecution of a defendant to permit the defendant to show
"good conduct." 2 11 The provisions of the Act were generally intended to
"strengthen[] the supervision over persons released pending trial" and
encourage the then-"current trend" of creating diversion programs as an
alternative to prosecution for low-level, nonviolent individual offend-
ers.212 However, the drafters of that Speedy Trial Act provision, in 1974,
were totally unfamiliar with the concept of a corporate deferred prosecu-
tion agreement, the first of which were entered in the 1990s, and which
208 18 U.S.C. § 3294 (2012).
209 See § 3297.
210 § 3293. Congress added a "mortgage lending business" to the definition of "financial
institution" in 2009. § 20.
211 § 3161(h)(2) ("Any period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attor-
ney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval
of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.").
212 See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1508, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7401;
S. Rep. No. 93-1021, at 36-37 (1974); see also Anthony Partridge, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Legis-
lative History of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 117 (1980) (referring to good be-
havior).
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did not begin to be common until after 2003, when the Department of
Justice revised its guidelines for organizational prosecutions.2 13 Such de-
ferred prosecution agreements typically focus on not just criminal fines,
forfeiture, restitution, or community service payments, but also on coop-
eration, adoption of compliance, and other "structural reforms." 2 14 What
"good conduct" means for a corporation, required to satisfy detailed
conditions subject to supervision by prosecutors, means something very
different than for an individual. Corporate offenders are nothing like
nonviolent, juvenile, or low-level individual offenders. Nor does the
statute provide any standard for a judge to evaluate whether a case is ap-
propriate for deferral of prosecution. As a result, judges have increasing-
ly struggled to assess what their role should be when deciding whether
to approve a deferred prosecution of a corporation, which can raise far
more complex issues than the typical individual matter.2 15
The Speedy Trial Act could, and should, be revised to include a sepa-
rate provision specific to corporations seeking deferred prosecution
agreements. One part of that revised standard could provide judges with
a set of standards for deciding whether to grant such a waiver of the reg-
ular speedy trial deadlines. One statutory consideration could be the ad-
equacy of the cooperation of the company. A judge could inquire wheth-
er that cooperation produced evidence concerning the culpable
individuals at the company.
Judges currently scrutinize the adequacy and degree of a criminal de-
fendant's "substantial assistance" at sentencing; for corporations, they
could do so at the deferred prosecution stage, which is increasingly the
213 Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at ch. 3.
214 Garrett, supra note 196.
215 E.g. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 1:12-cr-00763-JG, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) (citing to a judge's supervisory authority and noting that "approving
the exclusion of delay during the deferral of prosecution is not synonymous with approving
the deferral of prosecution itself"). I submitted an amicus brief on this issue regarding a pro-
posed deferred prosecution agreement, in which I presented in greater detail my views con-
cerning the scope of a judge's review authority under the current Speedy Trial Act provision.
Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae Law Professor at 18-19, United States v. Saena
Tech Corp., No. 14-cr-00066-EGS (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2014). In contrast, a defendant may not
challenge the prosecutor's discretionary decision to deny a deferred prosecution agreement.
United States v. Richardson, 856 F.2d 644, 647 (4th Cir. 1988) ("A defendant has no right to
be placed in pretrial diversion. The decision . .. is one entrusted to the United States Attor-
ney." (citations omitted)).
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stage that matters for the largest corporate offenders.2 16 Judges have in
rare cases also rejected as contrary to the public interest corporate plea
agreements that involved immunity or non-prosecution of the relevant
corporate officers or employees. 217 The first judge to do so, Federal Dis-
trict Judge Richard J. Leon, rejected outright a deferred prosecution
agreement with a company, "looking at the DPA in its totality," and not-
ing that not only were "no individuals .. . being prosecuted for their
conduct at issue here," but also "a number of the employees who were
directly involved in the transactions are being allowed to remain with
the company., 2 18
In order to clarify the role of a judge when reviewing a corporate
prosecution agreement, the relevant considerations could be set out in
the Speedy Trial Act at the deferred prosecution approval stage to ensure
that a company receives leniency only if it provides "substantial" coop-
eration that actually supports prosecutions of culpable individuals, or if
it can provide very good reasons why such individual prosecutions can-
not result.
3. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Revisions
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide a detailed and
somewhat flexible set of guidelines for the sentencing of organizations
in federal court.2 19 While they are not used in cases negotiated out of
court in deferred and non-prosecution agreements, while the guidelines
are themselves now advisory,220 and while many corporate plea agree-
ments are presented as "binding" agreements to federal judges,22 ' the
Guidelines can still have an effect on negotiations between prosecutors
and companies. The Guidelines, for example, emphasize corporate com-
pliance as a mitigating factor, and have influenced the development of
compliance programs and compliance as a central feature of corporate
216 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5Kl.1(a)(1) (2014)
(asking the judge to consider "the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the
defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assis-
tance rendered").
217 United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462, 1466-67 (10th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. 851, 853 (D. Utah 1989).
218 United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., No. 14-cr-121 (RJL), 2015 WL 729291, at *5
(D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2015). That ruling is as of the date of publication, still pending appeal.
219 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8D1.1 (2014).
220 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005).
221 See Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at 154.
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prosecution guidelines and negotiations.2 22 Scholars, such as Professor
Jennifer Arlen, have called these Guidelines a "failure" because they fail
to adequately reward cooperation and self-reporting by companies.2 23
The Guidelines reward an organization that "fully cooperated in the in-
vestigation."22 4 What that full cooperation means is then further defined:
A prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent in-
formation is whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement
personnel to identify the nature and extent of the offense and the indi-
vidual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct. However, the coopera-
tion to be measured is the cooperation of the organization itself, not
the cooperation of individuals within the organization. If, because of
the lack of cooperation of particular individual(s), neither the organi-
zation nor law enforcement personnel are able to identify the culpable
individual(s) within the organization despite the organization's efforts
to cooperate fully, the organization may still be given credit for full
225
cooperation.
This additional commentary from the Sentencing Commission appropri-
ately calls cooperation regarding culpable individuals a "prime test" of
cooperation. However, it highlights just cooperation that can "identify"
the individuals responsible and not also the cooperation required to fully
investigate those individuals and then prosecute them. To be sure, indi-
viduals may assert Fifth Amendment privilege or attorney-client and
other privilege, and not cooperate themselves, as the commentary indi-
cates. However, full corporate cooperation could be defined as providing
full information regarding culpable individuals and cooperating during
the pendency of all investigation and prosecution of culpable individu-
als. The cooperation that can earn an organization credit looks nothing
like the "substantial assistance" that individuals must provide and alone
can benefit from, if prosecutors move to recognize it at sentencing and
in which case a judge must then evaluate the significance of the individ-
226
ual's assistance. The new guidance from the Department of Justice
222 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1 (2014) ("Effective Compliance and Ethics
Program"); id. § 8C2.5(3); Garrett, Too Big to Jail, supra note 5, at ch. 3.
Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. Miami
L. Rev. 321, 346 (2012).
224 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(g)(l)-(2) (2014).
225 Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. n.13 (2014).
226 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2014).
2015] 1845
Virginia Law Review
will hopefully tighten the requirements for obtaining credit for corporate
cooperation; the Sentencing Commission can now tighten the guidelines
requirements as well.22 7
Absent stricter standards and guidance from the Sentencing Commis-
sion, legislation in the form of an organization-specific standard for Title
18, United States Code, Section § 3553(e) could similarly tighten the
test for corporation cooperation and link it more closely to true self-
reporting of misconduct and significant assistance in investigating and
prosecuting culpable individuals within the organization. A range of
other changes to the Organizational Guidelines could and should be
made, and are beyond the scope of this Article; however, that simple
change could highlight the importance of cooperation in individual pros-
ecutions to the sentence that a corporation ultimately receives.
B. Department ofJustice Policy
The Department of Justice, as noted, has increasingly articulated a
policy preference for targeting culpable individuals in corporate crime
cases. The DOJ Guidelines contained in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual
have long emphasized, as described, that "[o]nly rarely should provable
individual culpability not be pursued, particularly if it relates to high-
level corporate officers."228 Public concern regarding criminal prosecu-
tions of corporations that describe culpable conduct, but which are unac-
companied by individual prosecutions, has made the question quite
stark-if that has been the policy, then why is no one going to jail? Per-
haps the new policy indicating that such language should be taken more
seriously, and tasking prosecutors with a focus on individual culpability
at the earliest stages of corporate investigations, will represent a real
change in practice. Anecdotally, corporate counsel do appear to be re-
ceiving the message that cooperation must be more concrete and focused
on individual criminal responsibility, because DOJ officials have recent-
ly highlighted the importance of "true" corporate cooperation that pro-
vides "evidence against" the "culpable individuals."2 29 There certainly
has not been any discernable trend towards more individual prosecutions
227 The Yates Memo adds that prosecutors will not support "a cooperation-related reduc-
tion at sentencing" absent the company providing "complete factual information about indi-
vidual wrongdoers." Yates Memo, supra note 33, at 3 n.2.
228 See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 1, § 9-28.200(B).
229 Miller, supra note 32.
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in corporate cases. Further, as described, in such cases, although there
are defensible reasons why prosecutors might choose to focus solely on
the entity, there is so much variation between areas of federal practice
that the impression one has is of an entirely ad hoc approach.
Could the new changes or still additional changes at the DOJ level
improve matters? Prosecutors should have to do far more to justify, even
if internally, why they have targeted individuals in some areas and not in
others. Are employees who participate in price fixing simply more cul-
pable than bankers who ignore signs of money laundering or sales repre-
sentatives who promote off-label marketing of prescription drugs? Per-
haps so, but simply stating that the DOJ will endeavor to prosecute all
culpable individuals does not explain what the actual policy or practice
is. Declinations need not and should not be public, to protect reputations
of persons that prosecutors conclude did no criminal wrong. But where
prosecutors have found that a company's employees committed crimes,
but no employees are prosecuted, more should be explained. There is
even a concern that nonpublic amnesty or side-letter deals have been
reached with employees. To what degree that occurs, we cannot know.
The DOJ has at least clarified the relative importance of individual cul-
pability in corporate cases and the degree to which prosecutors should
credit cooperation that does not result in clear proof of individual culpa-
bility. Finally, the DOJ has announced that to be "eligible for any coop-
eration credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant
facts about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct." 2 30
C. Individual Accountability Through Corporate Prosecution
Even in cases in which the corporation is the ostensible focus, judges
and prosecutors can do more to insist on personal accountability. Struc-
tural reforms can themselves create detailed forms of accountability
within a firm, linking compensation, bonuses, and supervision to com-
pliance with criminal law and related regulations. The HSBC agreement,
for example, which received prominent criticism because it resulted in
no individual prosecutions, also contained terms requiring that all senior
executives have bonuses based on "the extent to which the senior execu-
tive meets compliance standards and values," together with the amount
230 Yates Memo, supra note 33, at 3.
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of the "clawed back" bonuses for senior officers.2 31 The bank spent hun-
dreds of millions of dollars on compliance improvements to prevent
money laundering, including hiring almost eight hundred new employ-
ees (where they had only about ninety full-time anti-money-laundering
employees before) and adding new automated systems to detect poten-
tially problematic transactions. Such far-reaching compliance reforms
may have great benefits to the public interest, perhaps farther reaching
than individual prosecutions, even if these benefits cannot be easily
measured in penalty dollars paid or months of jail time served.
In addition, corporate prosecutions can serve a "blaming" function, as
Professor Samuel Buell has noted, but the scapegoat concern remains if
that reputational harm falls more on the artificial entity than on the par-
ticular people whose actions brought about the criminal activity.23 2 Sen-
ior management can be required to personally take responsibility for
crimes; for example, there is the CEO "walk of shame" provision in the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, in which the judge can require a
corporation that has accepted responsibility for its crime to send its CEO
in to appear in court and receive the sentence and perhaps personally ac-
cept responsibility.23 3 In just a few high-profile cases, federal judges
have insisted that the CEO or executives do so, but perhaps judges
should more routinely ask that the top management place their reputa-
tions more concretely on the line; prosecutors could also more often de-
mand apologies as part of settlements.234
All of this is to highlight that there is no necessary tradeoff between
corporate and individual accountability. While perhaps aspirational, the
DOJ guidelines are quite right to highlight how "prosecutors should not
limit their focus solely to individuals or the corporation, but should con-
sider both as potential targets."235 Corporate criminal prosecutions can
be used to enhance accountability within firms, to secure cooperation in
investigations of individuals, and to accomplish still other important
231 Statement of Facts at 27, 30, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 11, 2012).
232 Buell, supra note 35, at 500-01.
233 See U.S Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5 cmt. n.15 (2014) ("The court may de-
termine that the chief executive officer or highest ranking employee of an organization
should appear at sentencing in order to signify that the organization has clearly demonstrated
recogition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility.").
23 Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev.
959, 961-62 (1999).
235 See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 1, § 9-28.200.
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goals, such as payment of fines and compensation of victims. 23 6 While in
some areas there are real questions raised by the relative lack of individ-
ual prosecutions, it would be a mistake to conclude that corporate prose-
cutions can be wholly substituted for individual prosecutions.
CONCLUSION
The criticisms of federal failures to prosecute top executives and of-
ficers after high-profile corporate crimes, particularly after the Global
Financial Crisis, have been unrelenting. 23 7 The non-prosecution of offic-
ers and individuals that I have documented, accompanying settlements
in some of the largest and most serious corporate crimes, provides still
more cause for concern. Department of Justice explanations for the lack
of individual prosecutions in particular high-profile cases like the HSBC
case, or in general as a matter of policy, are not always convincing or
fully responsive.
As timely as this problem is today, the concern is not a new one. Take
a law review note published in 1976, which complained of how the
"complexity of modern corporate decisionmaking tends both to obscure
and to diffuse responsibility for corporate actions."238 Consider also a
law review note published in 1961 (by now-Professor Alan Dershowitz),
which similarly expressed concern with government "inability and un-
willingness to obtain criminal convictions against individuals as well as
corporations in cases of acquisitive corporate crime."2 3 9 A 1946 congres-
sional report focused on how few antitrust prosecutions resulted in jail
236 On the question whether internal enforcement and plaintiffs' litigation could better hold
officers accountable, see, e.g., Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Offic-
ers' Duties, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 271, 283-84, 322 (2014).
237 To add additional examples to the collection of critical responses cited in the Introduction,
see, e.g. Jesse Eisinger, The Feds Stage a Sideshow, While the Big Tent Sits Empty, N.Y.
Times DealBook (Dec. 8, 2010, 3:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/where-are-
the-financial-crisis-prosecutions/?_r-0; Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, In Financial Cri-
sis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures, N.Y. Times, (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html; Frank Rich, Obama's Original Sin, N.Y. Mag. (July 3,
2011), http://nymag.com/news/frank-rich/obama-economy/presidents-failure. For an analysis
of these criticisms and an explanation of why they are overstated, see Peter Henning, If There
Is Overcriminalization, Why Are There So Many Complaints About the Failure to Prosecute
Wall Street Bankers? (forthcoming, on file with author).
238 Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 Yale L.J. 1091 (1976).239 Comment, Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the
Law of Sanctions, 71 Yale L.J. 280, 292 n.50 (1961).
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sentences for corporate officers.24 0 Professor Edwin H. Sutherland's
seminal work on the problem of white-collar crime focused on concerns
that business elites escaped adequate punishment for the harms they
caused.2 4 1 One can look at any given decade over the past century and
readily observe similar media, scholarly, and government criticism of
prosecutors for getting the balance of corporate and individual prosecu-
242Whtwutions wrong. What would it mean to get that balance right?
The empirical data presented in this Article place the non-prosecution
of individuals accompanying corporate prosecution agreements in the
context of what happens when individuals are charged. What one sees
are a high percentage of prosecution losses far exceeding what is typical
in white-collar matters, the relative lack of jail time or severe sentences,
and the mixed results. These enforcement patterns are less monolithic
than commonly understood.2 43 Prosecution practices do vary, and not all
corporate prosecutions are alike. Nor are the results obtained dramatical-
ly different, in some areas, from the far larger numbers of fraud prosecu-
tions, for example, of individuals that tend to lack prior criminal records.
However, to the extent that one is troubled by the uneven results in these
individual prosecutions, I have underscored how these criticisms of cur-
rent practice should not be taken too far to suggest that individual prose-
cutions are a substitute for corporate prosecutions.
Corporations are useful scapegoats. Putting to one side practical ob-
stacles towards prosecuting individuals, and the ways that corporate co-
operation can in theory assist in overcoming those obstacles, prosecuting
corporations can accomplish unique and important social and criminal
goals. This reasoning supported the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of a
respondeat superior standard for corporate criminal liability. As the
Court put it in its 1909 ruling in New York Central Railroad v. United
States, it "is a part of the public history of the times" that the particular
240 Staff of Monopoly Subcomm., Comm. on Small Bus., 79th Cong., United States Versus
Economic Concentration and Monopoly 257 (Comm. Print 1946).
241 Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (1949); Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar
Criminality, 5 Am. Soc. Rev. 1, 9 (1940).
242 For a bibliography that does one version of that, examining scholarship on the question
of corporate criminality liability during the twentieth century, see Joseph F.C. DiMento, Gil-
bert Geis & Julia M. Gelfand, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Bibliography, 28 W. St. U. L.
Rev. 1 (2001).
243 For a discussion of the variety of approaches towards federal corporate prosecutions,
see Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1775, 1788-1800
(2011) (discussing corporate prosecutions and international regulation).
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regulations "could not be effectually enforced so long as individuals on-
ly were subject to punishment for violation of the law," and that situa-
tion was why corporations were made criminally liable by Congress for
railroad rate violations.244 Former employees, even if prosecuted, cannot
change the corporate policies or culture going forward. They may often
be unable to pay a fine or provide restitution to victims. And sometimes
even their cooperation in investigations may not be as valuable as that of
the corporation itself, depending on what was memorialized in corporate
emails and other documents.
Corporations are complex scapegoats. As I have described, the an-
swers to those puzzles cannot be definitively obtained from examining
enforcement data, although some evidence does emerge from these pat-
terns. The deferred and non-prosecution agreements disproportionately
involve fraud prosecutions in which mens rea may pose an obstacle.
Bank secrecy and FCPA cases may also involve still additional practical
obstacles including far-flung operations with foreign employees and
complex shared compliance responsibilities. Prosecuting individuals re-
quires a substantial investment of resources, and in areas in which large
numbers of individuals are prosecuted for seemingly regulatory or non-
violent behavior, such as immigration violations or nonviolent drug of-
fenses, those cases are often extremely easy to prove and inexpensive to
bring en masse. En masse case processing of so many people, though,
should not be the primary goal of our federal criminal system.
A sensible place to begin reconsidering priorities is to consider alter-
natives to prosecution for nonviolent offenders, as the Department of
Justice has begun to do,245 and conversely, to ask whether resources and
cooperation of corporations could be better leveraged. In some areas,
such as antitrust, prosecutors have such an approach firmly in place. In
others, individual prosecutions are not a priority. Whether a turn towards
using corporate prosecutions to more often investigate and prosecute in-
dividuals is desirable in particular areas of white-collar practice raises
additional complex policy questions.
244 212 U.S. 481, 491, 495 (1909).
245 Yates Memo, supra note 33; Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks at
the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association's House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013);
Press Release, James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks: Alterna-
tives to Incarceration Program: The Use of "Drug Courts" in the Federal and State Systems
(May 21, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attomey-general-james-m-cole-
speaks-alternatives-incarceration-program-use-drug.
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Corporate complexity can be turned into an advantage. I do not sug-
gest that treating the corporation as a scapegoat is necessarily a pejora-
tive. Focusing on prosecuting the corporation alone can accomplish im-
portant social goals, ranging from compensating victims to structural
reform, particularly if there is a real focus on implementing effective
structural reforms that buttress the goals of regulation. Better use of a
corporation as an informant and a cooperator in order to target individu-
al wrongdoers can achieve important social goals as well. There need
not be a costly tradeoff between prosecuting individuals and corpora-
tions. The costs and benefits should be carefully considered. Much re-
mains unknown about the relationship between preventing crime at the
corporate level and at the individual level. While these are not easy
problems to study, our currently unconsidered and ad hoc approach to-
wards individual and corporate accountability deserves the criticism it
has received.
The entire project of federal corporate prosecutions has rapidly and
radically changed over the past decade with the rise of deferred and non-
prosecution agreements, the changing terms used to require companies
to adopt structural reforms, and the stunning growth in blockbuster fines
against corporations in criminal cases. As a result, much remains to be
studied and considered as this program of federal corporate criminal en-
forcement evolves. These data on individual prosecutions accompanying
deferred and non-prosecution agreements with corporations suggest far
more work needs to be done to examine how prosecutorial discretion is
exercised not only in organizational cases but also in accompanying in-
dividual prosecutions. Prosecutorial discretion in deciding how to charge
an organization is only one piece of the puzzle. Commentators have
been right to increasingly focus on the relationship between individual
accountability and the corporation. When and whether treating a corpo-
ration as a scapegoat is socially useful-which it clearly sometimes is-
also raises questions regarding the purposes of corporate criminal liabil-
ity more broadly.
Complex corporate crimes can best be addressed by complex corpo-
rate settlements. How effective those settlements are in holding individ-
uals accountable and preventing future crimes raises still more troubling
questions. The Department of Justice has not been amenable to making
transparent what occurs when these corporate agreements are imple-
mented, much less to collecting data regarding these prosecutions or
their performance. Even if there is no one-size-fits-all prescription for
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when corporate employees should be prosecuted, it is clear from these
data that individual prosecutions have been neglected, including because
there are real challenges in bringing such prosecutions in corporate
crime cases. Given the magnitude of these most serious corporate
crimes, we should all care deeply about better understanding the rela-
tionship between the criminal treatment of individuals and of corpora-
tions. Further, as I have argued in this Article, the solution is not to
abandon corporate prosecutions in favor of individual prosecutions, as
some critics have suggested. A range of statutory, sentencing, and policy
changes should be made to tighten the connection between corporate and
individual accountability. Corporate prosecutions need not come at the
cost of individual accountability. Instead, corporate prosecutions can and
should enhance individual accountability.
